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ABSTRACT
The Impact of Institutional Ownership on Firm Performance 
in the Hospitality Industry
by
Ming-chih Tsai
Dr. Zheng Gu, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor of Hotel Administration 
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas
Institutional investors have become important players in today’s financial markets 
and their increasing importance in corporate governance in the United States (U.S.) is 
further evidenced by the growing volume o f corporate equity they control. The ownership 
structure/firm performance relationship has always been a subject o f debate. Similarly, in 
the hospitality industry as o f June 2002, institutional investors were estimated to own 
$2.3 hillion, or 66.7% of total outstanding shares in PricewaterhouseCoopers’ lodging 
universe.
This dissertation examines the impact o f institutional ownership on firm performance
as measured by a proxy for Tobin’s Q in the restaurant, casino and hotel sectors from
1999-2003. Given the endogeneity o f institutional ownership in the restaurant and casino
sectors, firm performance in these areas is significantly dependent upon the percentage o f
institutional ownership, and vice versa. In the hotel sector, however, there is no
significant systematic relationship between institutional ownership and firm performance,
when all other firm-specific variables controlled.
iii
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This dissertation contributes to the body of the hospitality finance literature, 
particularly in the area o f corporate governance, by identifying significant relationships 
between institutional ownership and firm performance in the restaurant and casino sectors. 
In addition, this study reveals that investing institutionally in the restaurant and casino 
sectors may help hospitality industry investors mitigate the agency problem caused by the 
separation o f management from ownership. This, in turn, will enhance the value o f the 
firms in the capital market.
IV
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
Institutional investors have become important players in today’s financial markets. 
Their increasing importance in corporate governance in the United States (U.S.) is further 
observed from the growing volume o f corporate equity they control. As o f 2003, 
institutional investors were estimated to control 60% of all outstanding equity in the U.S. 
(Hayashi, 2003), compared to 45% in 1990, 33% in 1980 and 8% in 1950 (Taylor, 1990). 
Accompanying the growing volume of institutional shareholdings in the equity market, 
the role of institutional investors has changed dramatically from that o f simply passive 
investors to active monitors. Traditionally, institutional investors are not directly involved 
in corporate management decisions; instead, they simply follow the “Wall Street Rule” or 
an “exit policy” by selling their stakes when dissatisfied with the management or stock 
performance (Bathala, Moon, & Rao, 1994; Graves & Waddock, 1990). Further, they 
“window dress” their portfolios and exercise their power in terms o f buying winners and 
selling losers in the market place to change the market’s perception o f the risk or success 
o f the institution’s trading strategy (Lang & McNichols, 1997). Because o f their 
fragmented and transient ownership characteristics, institutions may trade off control for 
liquidity and thus act as passive investors (Bhide, 1993; Coffee, 1991; Rajgopal & 
Venkatachalam, 1997).
1
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With increasingly significant ownership o f equity in a firm, it has become less costly 
and yet more powerful for institutions to “voice” disagreement with the management 
instead o f following an “exit policy” by liquidating significant holdings at substantial 
discounts and, therefore, depressing the firm’s stock price (Coffee, 1991; Pound, 1992). 
Institutional investors, as opposed to non-institutional investors, are more likely to vote 
and engage in corporate management decisions due to their significant ownership of 
equity in the firms (Brickley, Lease & Smith, 1998) and attempt to influence top firm 
management to manage for the long-term interests o f shareholders (Holdemess & 
Sheehan, 1988; Hoskisson, Johnson & Moesel, 1994). In other words, institutional 
investors may have recently assumed a more effective monitoring role with collective 
capacity in the corporate governance arena. As a result, they may further influence 
corporate management decisions and possibly, firm performance (Black, 1992; Chaganti 
& Damanpour, 1991; Pound, 1991).
The observed increase in institutional ownership in the equity market has been 
attributed to the growth in pension funds (both public and private) and the passage o f the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) in 1974 (Graves & Waddock, 1990; 
Sherman, Beldona & Joshi, 1998). Public pension funds, such as the California Public 
Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS), are primarily defined benefit funds that 
provide retirement and health benefits to public employees (CalPERS, 2005). Public 
pension funds are governed by state regulations, and allowable investments made by fund 
administrators are prescribed by state legislation. State officials managing public pension 
funds are normally elected, and their compensation structures are generally not tied to 
fund performance. If  a public pension fund does not perform well enough to cover the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
fixed benefit payment to its beneficiaries under the defined benefit plan, the deficit comes 
from taxpayers. In addition, politically aspired public pension fund administrators may 
have a divergent orientation that is not in line with the best interests o f either the fund 
beneficiaries or other shareholders in the firm (Romano, 1993; Woidtke, 2002). On the 
other hand, private pension funds include both defined contribution funds and defined 
benefit funds, and are governed by ERISA. In December 1985, the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB) issued Statement o f Financial Accounting Standards No. 87 
governing employers’ accounting for pensions (FASB, 2004). ERISA and FASB No. 87 
require annual re-evaluation of pension funds by comparing each fund’s current assets 
and the present value o f future pension obligations as specified in the defined benefit plan. 
The employer’s contribution to the plan is reduced when the fund’s current assets 
increase (Drucker, 1986; Graves, 1988; Graves & Waddock, 1990), and this is likely to 
put short-term financial performance pressure on institutions (Chaganti & Damanpour, 
1991). Performance-based compensation structures for private pension fund 
administrators are also likely to offer incentives for fund administrators to pursue 
short-term gains instead o f value maximization over a long-term horizon.
The short-term vision o f private pension fund administrators is shared by mutual fund 
and investment bank managers who emphasize a high current return because o f their own 
reward systems (Johnson & Greening, 1999). Empirical studies show that mutual fund 
managers tend to hold a firm’s stock for less time than pension fund administrators 
(Gilson & Kraakman, 1991) and they may adjust the riskiness of their investment 
portfolio in an attempt to maximize their expected compensation, instead of shareholders’ 
wealth or firm value (Brown, Harlow & Starks, 1996). Mutual fund and investment bank
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
managers are often evaluated on a quarterly basis and a bonus/penalty is determined 
based on fund performance relative to an index calculated quarterly (Starks, 1987). Given 
the pressure for short-term profitability coupled with the potential difficulty o f disposing 
large blocks of shares without incurring a significant loss, mutual fund and investment 
bank managers are likely to vie for strategies and projects with a higher probability of 
short-term payoff and push firm management towards this orientation (Johnson & 
Greening, 1999). In addition, investors in mutual funds are entitled to liquidity and may 
retrieve their capital at the prevailing market price at any time (Sherman, Beldona & 
Joshi, 1998). This reinforces the short-term orientation o f mutual fund managers.
Different types o f institutional investors reveal different investment behaviors and 
pursue diverse objectives, subject to federal and state regulations, various clienteles, and 
other conditions and constraints. One thing they have in common, however, is that 
institutional investors have a fiduciary duty to their clients or beneficiaries, which 
requires them to act with loyalty and administer funds in a prudent manner (Association 
for Investment Management and Research “AIMR”, 1999). In other words, institutional 
investors, whether they have a short-term or long-term orientation, must represent their 
clients or beneficiaries and maximize their interests in the firms they invest. Thus, these 
large firm shareholders can become effective monitors and may increase firm value 
accordingly (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Black, 1992; Pound, 1991). Relationship 
investing, dictating that investing with the goal o f influencing the management o f the 
firm in which the investment is made (AIMR, 1999), can be key to a successful strategy 
for plan/firm value enhancement. Under ERISA, relationship investing is allowed by 
institutional investors if  an investment strategy is consistent with the fiduciary duty to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
enhance the value o f the plan’s investment in the firm, and hence, the enhancement of a 
firm’s value (AIMR, 1999).
While investing in a firm, institutional investors essentially represent a group of 
individual investors with the collective capacity and power to “voice” disagreement with 
firm management and to vote on corporate management decisions. Here, an agency 
relationship is said to exist where firm managers act as the agent o f institutional 
investors—the principal. Theoretically, in a principal— agent context, agents (managers) 
should act in the principals’ (shareholders) best interests. In other words, firm managers 
have a fiduciary duty to maximize shareholder wealth and firm value. However, problems 
exist due to the separation o f ownership and control in corporations (Berle & Means, 
1932; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Agency problems arise within a firm when firm 
managers pursue their own interests at the shareholders’ expense or when the interests of 
the two parties are not aligned. Agency costs, stemming from these problems, incur while 
the principal pays to keep their agents from committing aberrant activities (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Several mechanisms may mitigate agency problems, and one such 
instrument is concentrated shareholdings by institutions (Cmtchley, Jensen, Jahera & 
Raymond, 1999). Institutional investors assume responsibility for managerial monitoring 
from a corporate governance perspective derived from their own fiduciary duty to clients 
or beneficiaries. They are believed to help improve firm performance accordingly 
(Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Black, 1992; Pound, 1991).
Since Berle & Means (1932) first commented on problems caused by the separation 
o f ownership and control in corporations, the impact o f ownership structure on firm 
performance has been a subject o f debate. While a body o f literature has been dedicated
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
to examining the relationship between the two, no consensus has heen reached hy 
previous researchers as to whether ownership structure (e.g., shareholdings by institutions, 
corporate management, blockholders, etc.) influences firm performance. Also, the extent 
and directions to which such influence, if  any, is observed remain unclear (Agrawal & 
Knoeber, 1996; Chaganti & Damanpour, 1991; Clay, 2001; Craswell, Taylor, & Saywell, 
1997; Han & Suk, 1998; Loderer & Martin, 1997; McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Woidtke, 
2002). The ongoing debate is not dying down anytime soon as institutions have been 
playing a more important role and dominating the capital market in the U.S.
Institutional Ownership in the Hospitality Industry 
Publicly-traded firms in the hospitality industry, consisting mainly o f restaurant, 
casino and hotel firms, have also become investment targets for institutional investors 
since the early 1990s. During the economic recession o f 1990-1991, the hotel industry 
suffered from low occupancy rates with overbuilt room inventory in the late 1980s (Hotel 
& Motel Management, 1994). In late 1992, the hotel industry started to recuperate and it 
became profitable in 1993 (Block, 1998). Along with improved profitability and 
performance in the hotel industry, renovations on guest rooms, restaurants, meeting 
rooms, lobbies and other public spaces were initiated with available cash flow and, more 
importantly, with funding from the increased institutional investment in the hotel industry 
(Hotel & Motel Management, 1994). Observing the recovery and foreseeing the 
prosperous outlook of the hotel industry after the recession, institutional investors started 
to inject capital into the industry in an attempt not only to help enhance hotel profitability, 
but also to boost their own fund performance. Institutional investors’ confidence in and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
support to the hotel industry in terms of equity capital may have contributed to the 
improvement o f the average occupancy rate from 61% to 66%, and the increase o f the 
average daily rate from $59 to $79 during 1991-1998 (Gu & Gao, 2000).
As aforementioned, different types o f institutions reveal different investment 
behaviors and pursue diverse objectives subject to various conditions and constraints. In 
the context o f financing the development and growth o f the lodging industry, the same 
theorem applies. Using the Delphi technique, Singh & Schmidgall (2000) surveyed 39 
industry experts in 1998 and asked them to predict the probability (i.e., high, moderate, 
low probability, or not probable) o f capital provided from various types o f  institutions to 
ten lodging segments— luxury, upscale, midscale, economy, budget, extended-stay, 
convention, casino, resort, and motel— in 2000 and 2005, respectively. Possibly due to 
their expected favorable performance outlook, luxury, upscale and convention hotels 
were predicted to be more likely financed by pension funds, life insurance companies, 
and investment banks. On the other hand, casino hotels were not considered a promising 
investment target for institutions in the 39 panelists’ opinion. Casino hotels are expensive 
to build and the casino gaming market was considered saturated at that time, as evidenced 
by the Las Vegas Strip’s less favorable profitability outlook (Singh & Schmidgall, 2000). 
That is, from the perspective o f the 39 panelists in the study, institutional investors were 
in favor o f the hotel segments that could bring better financial returns on the capital 
investment. This finding is consistent with the notion that institutional investors must 
administer their funds in a prudent manner to fulfill their fiduciary duty to their clients or 
beneficiaries.
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As of June 2002, institutional investors were estimated to own $2.3 billion, or 66.7% 
of total outstanding shares in PricewaterhouseCoopers’ lodging universe, which included 
40 equities (Hotel & Motel Management, 2002). Out o f the 40 equities, 26 were C 
corporations and the remaining 14 were hotel real estate investment trusts (hotel REITs). 
The dominance o f institutional investors observed in the lodging industry seems parallel 
to that of the U.S. equity market as a whole. Previous research examined the relationship 
between institutional ownership and firm performance in the manufacturing sector; this 
study will examine that relationship in the hospitality industry.
Research Questions
The financial goal o f a firm is to maximize its value or shareholder wealth (Keown, 
Martin, Petty & Scott, 2003). Given their fiduciary duty, institutional investors may pick 
hospitality firms as part o f their investment portfolio and act as large shareholders in an 
attempt to enhance their fund performance and their clients’ or beneficiaries’ wealth. In 
other words, hospitality firm performance, which reflects fund performance to some 
extent, may be o f critical concern to institutional investors and their clients or 
beneficiaries.
Given the significant institutional ownership in the lodging industry (Hotel & Motel 
Management, 2002), and possibly in other sectors o f  the hospitality industry, the first 
question is whether some of the empirical evidence on the relationship between 
institutional ownership and firm performance observed in other industries exists in 
hospitality as well. That is, will the percentage levels o f institutional shareholdings of 
total outstanding shares in hospitality firms affect their performance? Or, will
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institutional investors help enhance firm performance through their presence and 
concentrated shareholdings in the firms? The hospitality industry possesses different 
characteristics and features different business and financial risks than other industries; 
and this may have influenced institutional investors’ behaviors and decisions in corporate 
governance. Furthermore, market capitalization of hospitality firms is generally much 
lower than that o f manufacturing firms. Institutions may be able to exert their collective 
power more freely in hospitality firms. Therefore, a significant relationship between 
institutional ownership and hospitality firm performance may be reasonably expected.
After looking at the restaurant, casino and hotel sectors in detail, will any significant 
relationship exist between institutional ownership and firm performance in each? When 
institutional investors make decisions about holding hospitality firm stocks, 
characteristics such as capital structure, profitability, riskiness or dividend policy specific 
to the three sectors may play an important role. This may lead to different institutional 
ownership/firm performance relationship patterns in the three sectors. As far as capital 
structure is concerned, the restaurant industry is generally characterized by light 
debt-usage, or low financial leverage, as evidenced by an average total debt to equity 
ratio o f 0.52 for restaurants for the quarter ending December 31, 2004, compared to 2.09 
for the casino industry and 1.18 for the hotel industry, respectively (Reuters, 2005). The 
relatively lower debt-usage o f the restaurant industry may attract institutional investors 
who prefer industries with low debt burden to reduce the risk associated with insolvency. 
On the other hand, the higher debt to equity ratio in the casino and hotel industries may 
lure institutions who tend to vote on riskier projects with higher return potential. For, if
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these projects are successful, they can pay off the deht holder at the contracted rate and 
capture a residual gain.
Justifications
Since Berle and Means (1932) first commented on problems caused by the separation 
o f corporate ownership and control, a body o f literature has been dedicated to examining 
the relationship between ownership structure (e.g., shareholdings by institutions, 
managers, or blockholders) and firm performance mainly in the manufacturing industries. 
Yet few scholars have studied how ownership structure may have influenced firm 
performance in the hospitality industry. To my best knowledge, only the impact of 
managerial ownership on firm performance has been examined for the restaurant industry 
(Gu & Kim, 2001) and for the hotel industry (Gu & Qian, 1999). However, no other 
studies have been documented on the relationship between institutional ownership and 
firm performance for any sectors o f the hospitality industry, despite the tremendous 
growth o f institutional ownership in the equity market in recent years and the significant 
institutional ownership in the lodging industry (Hotel & Motel Management, 2002). This 
study attempts to investigate the impact o f institutional ownership on firm performance in 
three sectors (i.e., restaurant, casino and hotel) o f the hospitality industry by testing the 
relationship between the two while controlling for the effect o f other firm specific 
variables.
Investors in the hospitality industry, like hospitality customers and operators, are 
important stakeholders. Firm performance, in terms of stock prices and other relevant 
measures (e.g., Tobin’s Q), is o f critical importance to the investors’ vested interest in
10
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hospitality firms and therefore affects their desire to invest in the industry. From a 
hospitality firm management perspective, recognizing possible influence from 
institutional investors on firm performance may help direct the firm towards value 
maximization that is in the shareholders’ best interests.
The findings of this study could contribute to the body o f hospitality finance 
knowledge, particularly in the area o f corporate governance, by providing empirical 
evidence from several important service sectors. The study identifies a significant 
relationship between institutional ownership and firm performance in two o f the three 
major sectors o f the hospitality industry. In addition, it reveals that investing 
institutionally in the restaurant and casino sectors may help hospitality industry investors 
mitigate the agency problem caused by the separation o f management from ownership, 
thus enhancing the value o f the firms in the capital market.
Delimitations
This study is limited to hospitality firms identified through their individual North 
American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code numbers and those with 
available accounting, financial and institutional ownership information between 
1999-2003. In particular, not all firms in the investment portfolio o f institutional investors 
during 1999-2003 were included in this study because o f securities reporting regulations 
set forth by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Institutional 
investment managers are only required to report their shareholdings on Form 13F to the 
SEC if  they exercise investment discretion of $100 million or more, in fair market value, 
in Section 13(f) securities (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2004). That is,
11
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shareholdings in hospitality firms hy institutional investment managers whose portfolios 
had less than $100 million fair market value were not reported to the SEC by those 
institutions during 1999-2003, and were excluded from this study.
Further, this study employs a proxy for Tobin’s g  as a measure o f firm performance. 
Although Tobin’s Q is the most commonly-used firm performance measure when 
modeling the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance in previous 
studies (Cho, 1998; Craswell et al., 1997; Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001; Hermalin & 
Weisbach, 1991; Himmelberg, Hubbard, & Palia, 1999; Holdemess, Kroszner, Sheehan, 
1999; Loderer & Martin, 1997; McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 
1988), possible distortions in Tobin’s Q in measuring intangible assets and replacement 
costs o f total assets could present a problem. Although other firm performance measures 
such as stock return and accounting return also exist, a proxy for Tobin’s Q, which is also 
widely used in previous studies (Clay 2001; Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, 2003; Kaplan & 
Zingales, 1997), was used as a measure o f firm performance in this study. This proxy 
measure is known as the book value o f total assets plus the market value of equity minus 
the sum of the book value o f common equity and deferred taxes, all divided by the book 
value o f total assets.
Definitions
1. BETA. This is a symbol representing the systematic risk o f a firm’s stock or the 
undiversifiable portion o f the investment risk inherent in stock ownership
2. DEBT. This is a symbol measuring financial leverage o f a firm. It is calculated as 
the ratio o f total debt to total assets.
12
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3. DIV. This is a symbol representing dividend payout ratio. The ratio is calculated 
as dividends divided by income before extraordinary items adjusted for common stock 
equivalents (COMPUSTAT, 2003)
4. Endogeneitv. A term used to describe the presence of an endogenous explanatory 
variable in this study.
5. Endogenous Variables. In simultaneous equations models, variables that are 
determined by the equations in the system or that are determined from within the system.
6. Exogenous Variables. Variables that are determined outside the model o f interest 
and that are uneorrelated with the error term in the model.
7. FIX. This is a symbol measuring expenditures on fixed plant and equipment, or 
capital expenditures, as a fraction of sales revenues.
8. Institutional Investors. Entity or organizations with large amounts o f capital to 
invest, including pension funds, mutual funds, investment companies, insurance 
companies, and endowment funds, and to exercise discretion over the investments of 
others.
9. Instrumental Variables (IVT In an equation with an endogenous explanatory 
variable, an instrumental variable is a variable that is uneorrelated with the error term in 
the equation, that does not appear in the equation, and that is partially correlated with the 
endogenous explanatory variable (Wooldridge, 2003).
10. North American Industry Classification Svstem (NAICS). A classification system 
that has replaced the U.S. Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system and was 
developed jointly by the U.S., Canada and Mexico.
13
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
11. Ordinary Least Squares (OLSI. A method o f estimating the parameters o f a 
multiple linear regression model by minimizing the sum of squared residuals 
(Wooldridge, 2003).
12. Proxy 0 . A  proxy that approximates Tobin’s Q\ calculated as the book value of 
total assets plus the market value of common equity minus the sum o f the book value of 
common equity and deferred taxes, all divided by the book value of total assets.
13. ROA. This is a symbol measuring firm profitability ratio. This ratio is defined as 
net income divided by total assets.
14. Shareholder Activism. Active monitoring of the management of firms rather than 
efficient portfolio selection without an active role in monitoring (Rajgopal & 
Venkatacbalam, 1997). Also known as relationship investing.
15. Simultaneous Equations Model (SEMI. A model consisting of two or more 
jointly-determined endogenous variables, where each endogenous variable can be 
expressed as a function o f other endogenous variables and of exogenous variables 
(Wooldridge, 2003).
16. SIZE. This is a symbol measuring firm size. It is calculated as logarithm o f total 
assets.
17. Two-stage Least Squares (2SLST A regression technique that uses instrumental 
variables that are uneorrelated with the error terms to compute fitted values o f the 
problematic predictor(s) in the first stage, and then uses the fitted values to estimate a 
linear regression model o f the dependent variable in the second stage (SPSS 11.0 Help 
File).
14
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
18. Tobin’s Q. A frequently used firm performance measure; defined as the ratio of 
the year-end total market value of the firm to the estimated replacement costs o f its 
assets.
Summary
The phenomenal growth o f institutional ownership in the equity market in the U.S. 
was discussed, and major types o f institutional investors were introduced. The need for 
an examination o f the relationship between institutional ownership and hospitality firm 
performance was justified. The research questions were devised accordingly. Also, the 
terms that are used throughout this dissertation were defined. Next, a review of related 
literature follows in Chapter Two.
15
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
This chapter reviews related literature on the relationship between institutional 
ownership and firm performance. The first section discusses the myopic institutions 
theory and is followed by a review o f the role o f institutions as monitoring agents in the 
second section. Further in the second section, institutional monitoring is reviewed in the 
agency framework, and institutional shareholder activism and the free rider problem are 
presented. State restrictions on institutional ownership in casino firms are introduced in 
the third section. Previous empirical studies on the relationship between institutional 
ownership and firm performance in other industries are reviewed in the fourth section. 
This chapter then concludes with a summary section.
The Myopic Institutions Theory 
Graves & Waddock (1994) argued that the increase in the level o f  institutional 
ownership has been associated with a decline in the competitiveness and financial 
performance o f U.S. firms. This is partially due to institutional investors’ need to show 
improved results on their funds frequently, and they pursue short-term performance 
because they are rewarded based on quarterly results (Graves & Waddock, 1994; Hansen 
& Hill, 1991 ; Starks, 1987). A survey o f 400 U.S. chief executives in 1987 revealed
16
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institutional investors as one o f the greatest sources of pressure on corporations to 
achieve short-term performance (Nussbaum & Dobrzynski, 1987). As a result, top firm 
management is often accused o f not managing the firm for the long-term due to 
short-term performance pressure from institutional investors, or being non-responsive to 
diverse stakeholders such as communities, employees and the environment that could 
possibly help enhance firm performance in the long run (Johnson & Greening, 1999).
The short-term vision o f institutional investors has been associated with the myopic 
institutions theory. It posits that institutional fund managers are under pressure from their 
superiors for short-term performance and they make their “buy” or “sell” decisions in 
response to organizational pressures and factors affecting their job security and 
advancement (Graves, 1988; Hansen & Hill, 1991; Hill, Hitt & Hoskisson, 1988; 
Loescher, 1984). That is, it is safer for institutional fund managers to simply dispose of 
shares of poorly-performing firms and buy better-performing ones than to incur 
monitoring costs to influence firm decisions and run the risk o f further deterioration of 
fund performance by the declining stocks (Hansen & Hill, 1991). Institutional investors 
are viewed as not willing to invest their “time” in poorly-performing firms, and they may 
not he willing to vote on projects that have a longer payback period, either. For a sample 
o f 22 computer manufacturing firms between 1976 and 1985, Graves (1988) provided 
empirical evidence that a negative relationship exists between the level o f institutional 
ownership and research & development (R&D) expenditures. Explicitly, institutional 
investors were found not to be committed to R&D, which served as a proxy for internal 
long-term investment in the study.
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Although the myopic institutions theory is supported by theoretical and empirical 
foundations as stated above, some researchers (Bushee, 1998; Hansen & Hill, 1991; 
Karake, 1996; Rajgopal & Venkatachalam, 1997) offered opposite evidence and 
challenged the theory. When studying four technology-driven industries including 
pharmaceutical, chemical, computer and aerospace between 1977-1987, Hansen & Hill 
(1991) did not find institutional ownership and R&D intensity negatively-related. Rather, 
they found a significant and positive relationship between institutional ownership and 
R&D intensity, which discredits the myopic institutions theory. R&D intensity in their 
study represented R&D expenditures as a percentage o f total sales.
Additional evidence opposing the myopic institutions theory was presented by Karake 
(1996) who examined the relationship between institutional ownership and information 
technology investment/performance. Using relative information technology index (RITI) 
as a proxy for mid to long-term firm investment commitment, Karake (1996) surveyed 
305 information technology executives in the U.S. and found a positive relationship 
between the level o f institutional ownership and the company’s RITI. In other words, 
despite the possibility o f  short-term earnings depression and volatility, institutional 
investors do value companies with long-term investments in information technology.
Firm managers may become myopic to some extent if  the myopic institutions theory 
is to hold. Fearing myopic institutions’ selling large blocks o f firm shares that may 
depress share price, firm managers may become myopic in artificially inflating current 
earnings. Proposing a probit model relating the sign of discretionary accruals (i.e., 
income increasing or decreasing) to the level o f institutional ownership with 5,707 
firm/year observations between 1989-1995, Rajgopal & Venkatachalam (1997) found
18
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neither the percentage o f institutional ownership nor the number of institutional investors 
systematically correlated to the type o f aecrual manipulation. That is, the extent o f 
institutional ownership does not motivate firm managers to engage in income increasing 
accounting accruals. So, institutional investors were not myopic in pressuring firm 
managers for short-term performance in their study.
As opposed to Rajgopal & Venkatachalam’s (1997) study using a lower-cost form of 
earnings management o f discretionary accruals, Bushee (1998) examined R&D cuts, 
representing a more costly form of earnings management, as related to the level o f 
institutional ownership. Proposing a logit model that predicts the probability o f R&D cuts 
from the percentage o f institutional ownership and a set of control variables, Bushee 
(1998) found that when institutional ownership is high, firm managers are less likely to 
cut R&D expenditures to reverse an earnings decline. In other words, the presence o f 
institutional investors ensures that managers choose R&D levels that maximize firm 
value for the long-run instead o f meeting short-term earnings goals.
Thus, it is apparent that not all institutional investors are myopic as theorized. 
Contrary to the myopic institutions theory, more plausible evidence on the long-term 
orientation of institutional investors provides theoretical support that hospitality firm 
performance may be influenced through concentrated shareholdings by institutional 
investors in a positive way.
Institutions as Monitoring Agents 
Institutional investors, in view of their significant shareholdings, have more incentive 
to monitor firm managers from committing aberrant activities and opportunistic behavior
19
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(Bathala et al., 1994; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). Institutions can influence corporate 
management decisions by taking an active monitoring role in the decision making process 
rather than selling their shareholdings when dissatisfied with firm management. The 
benefits that large shareholders obtain from their monitoring efforts are more likely to 
exceed the costs that they bear (Grossman & Hart, 1990; Huddart, 1993; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1986). Moreover, large ownership positions, along with greater colleetive 
capacity and power, allow institutions to exert greater influence on corporate 
management decisions. Possible actions taken by institutions include pressuring firm 
management for a variety o f reforms, replacing firm management team, voting on 
corporate management decisions and policies, and structuring executive compensation 
plans (Melcher & Oster, 1993; Monks & Minow, 1995). The role that institutions play as 
monitoring agents will be discussed next by reviewing institutional monitoring in the 
agency framework, institutional shareholder activism, and the free rider problem.
Institutional Monitoring in the Agency Framework 
Agency theory hypothesizes that because people are self-interested in the end, they 
will have conflicts of interests on certain issues when they attempt to engage in 
cooperative endeavors (Jensen, 1998). The modem corporation is subject to agency 
conflicts arising from the decision-making and risk-bearing functions o f the firm. Losses 
derived from such conflicts and to the parties involved are termed agency costs (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). One source of agency costs is excessive perquisite consumption hy firm 
managers. Managers have a tendency to consume excessive perks and engage in other 
opportunistic behavior because they receive the full benefit o f such activity but bear less 
than the full share o f the costs. Jensen & Meckling (1976) further define agency costs as
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the sum of the monitoring expenditures by the principal, the bonding expenditures by the 
agent and, lastly, the residual loss o f the principal. While managerial ownership and debt 
leverage are two possible mechanisms to mitigate agency problems between shareholders 
and management, and reduce agency costs leading to firm value enhancement (Grossman 
& Hart, 1982; Harris & Raviv, 1991; Jensen, 1986; MeConnell & Servaes, 1990; Morck 
et al., 1988), institutional ownership serves as an alternative monitoring mechanism of 
firm value enhancement in the agency framework (Bathala et al., 1994).
Using the two-stage least squares (2SLS) technique in a simultaneous equations 
framework, Bathala et al. (1994) examined 516 firms listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE), the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and the over-the-counter 
(OTC) market in 1988 and found that institutional ownership is negatively related to both 
debt ratio and managerial ownership. Firms with high debt leverage may incur higher 
agency costs o f debt inherent in strict debt covenants that lower the default risk of 
creditors (Grossman & Hart, 1982). The existence o f institutional investors reduces the 
need o f using debt leverage to control agency conflicts between firm managers and 
shareholders, although a second type o f agency conflict between institutional investors 
and creditors may exist (Keown et al., 2003). Additional monitoring provided by 
institutional investors also creates less need to utilize managerial ownership to control 
agency costs. Institutional investors serve as effective monitoring agents and help in 
reducing agency costs. These conclusions were supported hy Crutchley et al. (1999).
Crutehley et al. (1999) argued that managers internally choose the level o f dividend 
payout, debt leverage and insider ownership as mechanisms to reduce agency costs. They 
hypothesize that institutional ownership serves as an external monitoring mechanism that
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can help reduce agency costs as well. Crutehley et al. (1999) examined 812 
eross-sectional NYSE/AMEX firms in 1987 and 1993 using the three-stage least squares 
(3SLS) technique in a simultaneous equations system. They found a negative relationship 
between institutional ownership and the three internally-chosen mechanisms in the 
sample firms in 1993. Their study suggested that managers view the outside institutional 
monitoring as a substitute for the three internal monitoring mechanisms and argued the 
efficient monitoring role o f institutional investors. Although their 1987 sample did not 
yield significant evidence of institutional monitoring as a substitute for other monitoring 
mechanisms, the noteworthy results o f their 1993 sample documented the growth and 
increasing importance o f institutional investors as monitoring agents in the agency 
Iramework.
In an attempt to classify institutional investors as active monitors o f firm managers or 
simply passive voters in the case o f antitakeover charter amendments (ATCA), Agrawal 
& Mandelker (1990) investigated the relationship between institutional ownership and the 
changes in stock prices around the announcements o f ATCA using a sample o f 349 
NYSE/AMEX firms between 1979-1985. When ATCAs are proposed by firm managers 
to block hostile takeover attempts, the monitoring role o f large shareholders and 
institutional investors, in particular, is o f critical importance because ATCAs are subject 
to shareholders’ approval and could result in either a positive or negative wealth.
Agrawal & Mandelker’s (1990) findings suggest that when institutional ownership is 
large, the stock market reaction to ATCA proposals is more favorable. This is consistent 
with the active monitoring hypothesis on the role o f institutional investors. Other studies 
(Brickley et ah, 1988; Jarrell & Poulsen, 1987) also provide similar conclusions on the
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active monitoring role o f institutional investors in the case of ATCA. Brickley et al. 
(1988) found that when firm managers propose ATCAs that are harmful to the 
shareholders, a positive relationship exists between institutional ownership and the 
proportion o f shareholders voting against the proposals. Jarrell & Poulsen (1987) reported 
that firms proposing detrimental ATCAs have lower institutional ownership.
Thus, the active monitoring role played by institutional investors in the agency 
framework not only mitigates agency conflicts between shareholders and management, 
and agency costs, but also may help increase shareholder wealth and enhance firm value 
in the long run.
Institutional Shareholder Activism 
The SEC’s Shareholder Proposal Rule 14a-8 provides an opportunity for a 
shareholder, even one owning a relatively small amount o f a firm’s securities, to submit 
issues for inclusion in the firm’s proxy material and for presentation to a vote at an 
annual meeting (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2004). The rule allows 
shareholders to pursue their agendas regarding corporate governance and corporate 
performance through a formal mechanism. Beginning in the mid 1980s, some public 
pension funds developed reputations as shareholder activists. From 1987-1994, public 
pension funds sponsored 463 proxy proposals seeking changes in corporations’ 
governance (Gillan & Starks, 2000). Three main factors led to the emerging role o f 
institutional shareholder activists. Firstly, institutional investors find it difficult to dispose 
of their substantial shareholdings without taking a significant discount when dissatisfied 
with firm management or firm performance. Secondly, a large portion o f institutional 
investors’ portfolio that is indexed precludes them from share churning. The low turnover
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of public pension funds reflects their levels of indexing. CalPERS has about 10% annual 
turnover in its total equity holdings while the New York State and Local Retirement 
System has around 7% (Gillan & Starks, 2000). Lastly, changes in proxy rules in 1992 
relaxed rigorous restrictions and have made communication and coordination among 
institutional shareholders easier, and, therefore, lowered the cost o f monitoring efforts 
(Admati, Pfleiderer & Zeehner, 1994). More difficulties in selling without recognizing a 
huge loss, less flexibility in turning over shareholdings and less rigorous regulations 
motivate public pension funds for shareholder activism and monitoring. As a result, 
organizations such as Institutional Shareholders Services, Inc. (ISS) and The Council of 
Institutional Investors (CII) were established and engage in aligning institutional 
investors and providing proxy voting and corporate governance services.
Private pension funds and mutual funds, on the other hand, also engage in shareholder 
activism. In a survey o f 231 portfolio managers, 77% of the respondents indicated that 
they had participated in some sort o f shareholder activism in the previous year, either by 
communicating directly with the board of directors, sponsoring a shareholder resolution 
or voting on shareholder proposals (Felton, 1997).
Many empirical studies on the relationship between institutional shareholder activism 
and firm performance have led to mixed conclusions (Del Guereio & Hawkins, 1999; 
Karpoff, Malatesta & Walkling, 1996; Martin, Kensinger & Gillan, 1996; Opler & 
Sokobin, 1997; Smith, 1996; Wahal, 1996). Advocates o f institutional shareholder 
activism argue that targeting firms requires closer monitoring o f firm management that is 
beneficial to all shareholders o f the firm. Further, shareholder activists focus on the 
long-term development o f the firms and can possibly help enhance firm performance as a
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result (Gillan & Starks, 2000). Examining 117 firms that had poor share price 
performance during four years before being listed on the CII’s focus list between 
1991-1994, Opler & Sokobin (1997) reported significant findings that the firms had 
improved share performance and increased in return on assets (ROA) over the two years 
following listing. Smith (1996) investigated 51 firms targeted by CalPERS between 
1987-1993 and found that firms adopting proposal solutions (e.g., creating shareholder 
advisory committee or restructuring executive compensation) experienced positive 
abnormal returns over a longer period o f time. However, he suggested it would be 
detrimental to shareholders if  proposal solutions were not adopted. That is, whether 
institutional shareholder activism can improve firm performance depends upon the 
outcome o f firm targeting.
Opponents o f institutional shareholder activism, however, argued that institutions 
may impair firm management and corrupt firm performance due to their lack of skills and 
experience in improving managers’ decisions (Lipton & Rosenblum, 1991; Wohlstetter, 
1993). Studying a sample o f 125 firms targeted by five activist institutions between 
1987-1993, Del Guereio & Hawkins (1999) did not find any evidence o f abnormal 
returns o f the sample firms. Further, the same conclusion was made with sub-samples 
grouped by sponsor, outcome and proposal topic. Karpoff et al. (1996) examined 290 
firms, representing 583 shareholder proposals, and did not find any significant abnormal 
returns o f the sample firms around Wall Street Journal announcements on proposals, 
around proxy mailing dates, or around shareholder meeting dates. Their study did not 
find significant abnormal returns following successful proposals in the long run, either. 
Martin et al. (1996) analyzed the impact o f institutional shareholder activism on Sears’
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share performance. They did not find significant abnormal returns around three specific 
event dates, one o f whieh was the announcement o f  its listing on CalPERS’ target roster. 
Examining firms targeted by the nine most active public pension funds between 
1987-1993, Wahal (1996) did not find any significant relationship between shareholder 
activism and long-term stock performance, or between shareholder activism and net 
income.
The empirical evidence discussed above casts doubt on the efficacy of institutional 
shareholder activism in improving firm performance, even though firm performance is an 
important determinant when pension funds target firms for corporate governance 
proposals (Huson, 1997; John & Klein, 1995).
Free Rider Problem
Public pension funds sponsored 463 proxy proposals seeking changes in corporate 
governance between 1987-1994 (Gillan & Starks, 2000); however, only 13 institutions 
out of a sample o f 975, were identified as having ever submitted a shareholder proposal 
during a similar period 1986-1994 (Daily, Johnson, Ellstrand & Dalton, 1996). In other 
words, few institutional investors are considered activist shareholders that are willing to 
spend time and money on corporate governance issues. Even if  they do actively 
participate in corporate governance, their spending on shareholder activism is 
considerably less than that on active money management ensuring that spending on 
shareholder activism will not adversely impact their returns (Black, 1997). CalPERS 
spends approximately $500,000 annually, or 0.002% of their domestic equity holdings on 
all activism activities (Smith, 1996) and the Teachers Insurance Annuity 
Association-College Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF) spends about $I million, or
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0.002% o f their assets (Del Guereio & Hawkins, 1999) annually, whereas active 
management fees and trading costs normally range from 0.2% to 0.5% (Black, 1997). 
That is, the limited expenditures on activism or corporate governance by institutional 
investors implies that the benefit expected from the activity might not be able to cover the 
cost incurred (Pozen, 1994). The potential for some institutional investors to free ride on 
the governance efforts o f others may partially account for the lack o f attention and funds 
to governance issues (Black, 1997).
The free rider problem may also be observed when individual investors who own a 
small portion o f equity share the benefit o f institutional monitoring efforts without 
incurring any monitoring costs. Even when individual investors have incentives to 
monitor, they spend time and money studying materials in an attempt to vote for the 
proposal that is most beneficial. However, their vote may not be influential; they intend 
to free ride with larger shareholders or institutional investors in particular (Harford, Chen 
& Li, 2004; Maug, 1998; Stoughton & Zeehner, 1998). Thus, the free rider problem 
could deter institutional investors from engaging in corporate governance efforts and 
possibly dilute their influence on firm performance.
Restrictions on Institutional Ownership 
in the Casino Industry 
When investing in casino firms, institutional investors are restricted by certain 
regulations such as the limited percentage o f institutional ownership permitted in a casino 
firm and astricted purpose o f investment (Nevada Gaming Control Board, 2005). A 
review o f noteworthy state regulations on institutional ownership in easino firms in two
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representative gaming jurisdictions, Nevada and New Jersey, in the U.S., is presented as 
follows.
Nevada
Regulations o f the Nevada Gaming Commission (Commission) and State Gaming 
Control Board (Board) require that beneficial owners o f more than 10% o f the voting or 
equity securities o f a registered casino gaming corporation apply to the Commission for a 
finding o f suitability within 30 days after the Chairman o f the Board mails a written 
notiee requiring such filing (Nevada Gaming Control Board, 2005). An institutional 
investor with beneficial ownership o f more than 10% but not more than 15% of a casino 
firm’s voting or equity securities, however, may apply to the Commission for a waiver if  
the institutional investor holds the voting or equity securities for investment purposes 
only. Nevertheless, an institutional investor with a waiver approved, cannot grant an 
option to purchase, sell, assign, transfer, pledge or make any disposition o f any voting or 
equity securities without prior approval o f the Commission. Therefore, this highly 
decreases the liquidity o f institutional shareholdings in casino firms. Regulation 15.430 
(Nevada Gaming Control Board, 2005) further requires that:
Institutional investors hold and/or have held the voting or equity securities o f the 
corporate licensee or the holding company for (1) investment purposes only, and 
(2) in the ordinary course o f business as an institutional investor and not for the 
purpose o f (a) causing, directly or indirectly, the election o f the member o f the 
board o f directors, or (b) affecting any change in the corporate charter, bylaws.
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other organic document, management, policies or operations o f the corporate 
licensee or any o f its affiliates (p. 174).
Institutional investors will be subjeet to lieensing, registration or a finding o f 
suitability, in order to proteet publie interest, if  they were found not complying with the 
waiver requirements. Further, if  an institutional investor subsequently changes its intent 
not to hold its voting or equity seeurities for investment purpose only, it must notify the 
chairman o f the Board within two business days (Nevada Gaming Control Board, 2005).
New Jersev
The Casino Control Aet in New Jersey applies similar waiver requirements to 
institutional investors in its jurisdiction as Nevada. The major differences between the 
two states in granting a waiver o f lieensee qualifieation for an institutional investor are 
that New Jersey restricts institutional ownership to 10% o f the equity securities or 50% of 
debt securities in a easino firm, and institutional investors are given up to 30 days to 
notify the New Jersey Casino Control Commission of a change o f intent (New Jersey 
Casino Control Commission^ 2005). Institutional investors applying for the waiver are 
also subject to the “investment purposes only” rule.
How will these regulations affeet the relationship between institutional investors and 
casino firm performance? Restrictive state regulations, placed upon institutional investors 
who intend to invest intensively in the easino industry on the one hand but do not want to 
be subject to rigorous rules on the other, not only may deter them from making excessive 
capital investment but also may reduee their influence on corporate governance and 
possibly firm performanee when exercising their fiduciary duty. Therefore, the state
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regulations imposed on institutions that are major casino firm shareholders may prevent 
the institutions from exercising their colleetive power or from having any signifieant 
impact on firm performance. Nevertheless, institutional investors, as long as each owns 
less than 15% o f outstanding shares o f a casino firm, may act as a cohort o f investors and 
collectively exert signifieant influence on casino firm performance. Therefore, a 
significant impact of institutional ownership on casino firm performance may still be 
reasonably expected.
Institutional Ownership and Firm Performance 
Pound (1988) argued that institutional investors may affect firm value either in a 
positive or a negative manner. The positive effeet occurs when institutional investors act 
as more efficient monitors o f firm managers than individual shareholders. Institutional 
investors not only have greater incentives to monitor, which accompany the large 
financial stakes they invest in a firm, but they also have greater expertise in monitoring 
the firm at lower costs than small individual investors. The negative effect occurs when 
institutional investors conspire with firm managers against their own fiduciary duty to 
their beneficiaries. A third possibility, argued by Demsetz (1983), is that no relationship 
between ownership structure (e.g., insider, block shareholders) and firm performance 
should be observed beeause a firm’s ownership structure is endogenously determined 
such that its shareholders’ wealth is maximized. Empirical studies have shown 
inconsistent results in how institutional ownership may influenee firm performance 
(Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Chaganti & Damanpour, 1991; Clay, 2001; Craswell et ah, 
1997; Han & Suk, 1998; Loderer & Martin, 1997; MeConnell & Servaes, 1990; Woidtke,
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2002). The inconclusive may stem from inconsistency in variable measurement including 
firm performance measures and other control variables, sample periods, estimating 
teehniques (e.g., OLS and 2SLS) and the aceountability of the endogeneity o f a firm’s 
ownership structure (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001).
Tobin’s 0  as Firm Performance Measure
Tobin’s Q is the most commonly-adopted performance measure in modeling the 
relationship between ownership structure and firm performance in previous studies (Cho, 
1998; Craswell et ah, 1997; Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991; 
Himmelberg et ah, 1999; Holdemess et ah, 1999; Loderer & Martin, 1997; McConnell & 
Servaes, 1990; Morck et ah, 1988). It is defined as the ratio o f the year-end total market 
value o f the firm to the estimated replacement costs o f total assets (Tobin, 1969). When a 
firm is worth more than its value based on what it would cost to rebuild it, or when 
Tohin’s Q is larger than one, excess profits are being earned and these profits are above 
and beyond the level necessary to keep the firm in the industry (Lindenberg & Ross, 
1981).
Lindenberg & Ross (1981) devised a formula (L-R Q) to measure Tobin’s Q, and the 
majority o f the data needed was obtained from the Manufacturing Sector Master File at 
the National Bureau o f Economic Research (NBER) and Standard & Poor’s 
COMPUSTAT. Their formula is as follows;
 ̂ ^  (PREFST + VCOMS + LTDEBT + STDEBT- ADJ)
L-R Q -  -----
(TOTASST -  BKCAP + NETCAP)
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where,
PREFST: the liquidating value o f a firm’s preferred stock;
VCOMS: the price o f the firm’s common stock multiplied hy the number o f shares 
outstanding on the last trading day o f the year (i.e., December 31);
LTDEBT: the value of the firm’s long-term debt adjusted for its age structure;
STDEBT: the book value of the firm’s current liabilities;
ADJ: the value o f the firm’s net short-term assets;
TOTASST: the book value of the firm’s total assets;
BKCAP: the book value o f the firm’s net capital stock; and,
NETCAP: the firm’s inflation-adjusted net capital stock (Lindenberg & Ross, 1981).
Due to the lack o f available data for caleulating the L-R Q from NBER after 1987 and 
possible diffieulty in estimating the replacement costs o f total assets (the denominator of 
Tobin’s Q), Chung & Pruitt (1994) proposed a simple approximation o f Tobin’s Q  and it 
was widely adopted in studies (e.g., Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996) examining the ownership 
structure/firm performance relationship thereafter.
Using basie finaneial and accounting information readily available from a firm’s 
financial statements, Chung & Pruitt (1994) formulated an approximate Q that is defined 
as follows:
^  (MVE + PS + DEBT)
Approximate Q = ------------— --------- —
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where,
MVE: the product of a firm’s share price and the number o f shares outstanding on the last 
trading day of the year;
PS: the liquidating value o f the firm’s outstanding preferred stock;
DEBT: the value of the firm’s short-term liabilities net o f its short-term assets, plus the 
book value o f the firm’s long-term debt; and,
TA: the hook value of total assets o f the firm (Chung & Pruitt, 1994).
Approximate Q in their study can explain 96.6% of the variations in L-R Q. A similar 
Q  measure, the simple Q, was developed by Perfect & Wiles (1994) and is defined as 
follows:
^  (EQUITY + LTD + STD+ PFD + CV)
Simple Q = ---------------------------------------------
ASSET
where,
EQUITY : the market value of equity;
LTD: the book value of long-term debt;
STD: the book value o f  short-term debt;
PFD: the liquidating value o f preferred stock;
CV : the book value of eonvertible debt and convertible preferred stock; and, 
ASSET : the book value of total assets.
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Perfect & Wiles (1994) reported a correlation o f 0.93 with L-R Q.
Although accounting profit rates (e.g., return on equity “ROE”, or return on assets 
“ROA”) have also heen used as firm performance measures in other studies (e.g., 
Chaganti & Damanpour, 1991; Demsetz & Lehn, 1985), two major aspects, a time 
perspective and the measuring entity, differentiate Tobin’s Q from other accounting profit 
measures (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001). Firstly, as far as time perspective is coneemed, 
a backward-looking accounting profit rate allows investors to look at what management 
has aecomplished, while the forward-looking Tobin’s Q helps investors gauge what 
management will achieve in addition to what they have already done. Secondly, for 
accounting profit rate, the accountant is the entity measuring accounting performance and 
is restricted by the accounting standards and constraints, while for Tobin’s Q, the 
eommunity o f investors, restricted by their acumen, optimism or pessimism, are the entity 
measuring firm performance involving certain investor psychology (Demsetz & 
Villalonga, 2001). Tobin’s Q is more favorable than accounting profit rate to most o f the 
previous researchers when modeling the ownership structure/firm performanee 
relationship beeause investors do not ignore past accounting profit when determining 
reasonable expectations for the future profitahility o f firms. That higher stock prices often 
accompany higher accounting profit rates is reflected by the numerator o f Q. Further, the 
denominator o f Q, when measured by the book value o f tangible assets rather than by 
replacement costs, is similar to what accountants use in estimating the firm’s capital 
investment (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001).
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Ownership Endogeneitv 
One o f the possible factors leading to inconclusive results o f the ownership 
structure/firm performance relationship is the treatment o f the ownership structure 
variable. Demsetz (1983) first argued that the ownership structure o f a firm, whether 
coneentrated or diffused, is an endogenous outcome o f competitive selection within the 
firm leading to firm value maximization. According to Demsetz (1983), ownership 
endogeneity implies that the underlying conditions under whieh a firm operates 
determines which ownership structure is best for shareholders. That is, an equilihrium 
organization o f the firm is aehieved when various advantages and disadvantages of 
monitoring cost and cost o f production are balanced. Furthermore, Demsetz (1983) 
argued that there is no reason to expect small firms with highly concentrated ownership 
structures to perform better or worse than large firms with highly diffuse ownership 
structures (Ftarold Demsetz, personal communieation, March 3, 2004). In other words, no 
systematic relationship between ownership structure and firm performance should be 
observed.
Demsetz’s (1983) view on ownership endogeneity is partially challenged by Agrawal 
& Knoeber (1996). Treating the division o f shares between insiders and outsiders as an 
internally-chosen decision within the firm, Agrawal & Knoeber (1996) asserted that the 
level o f shareholdings by institutions is chosen externally. They further argued that 
institutions make an independent choice o f the size o f their shareholdings, and, therefore, 
their deeisions are not neeessarily consistent with firm value maximization. This 
argument implies that a systematic relationship between institutional ownership and firm 
performance may exist.
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When modeling the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance 
in an endogenous framework, due to considerations such as insider information and 
performance-based compensation, firm performance is at least as likely to affect 
ownership structure as ownership structure is to affect firm performance. Therefore, the 
impaet o f firm performance on ownership structure should be examined simultaneously 
while investigating the impact o f ownership structure on firm performance if  ownership 
endogeneity is to be accounted for (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001). Other studies (Cho, 
1998; Clay, 2001; Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001; Holdemess et 
ah, 1999; Loderer & Martin, 1997) echoed Demsetz and provided further evidenee o f the 
endogeneity o f ownership straeture when modeling the relationship between ownership 
stmcture (e.g., insider, bloekholder, and institutional) and firm performanee. In some 
studies where ownership structure was treated endogenously, firm performance measure 
was found to affeet ownership structure but not the reverse. Cho (1998) examined the 
relationship between insider ownership and firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q 
using 326 o f the 500 largest U.S. firms {Fortune 500) in 1991, and found that insider 
ownership inereases significantly with Tobin’s Q, but not vice versa. Demsetz & 
Villalonga (2001) studied how large shareholders may relate to firm performance 
measured hy Tobin’s Q using a 223-firm random sub-sample o f the sample in the original 
Demsetz & Lehn’s (1985) study. They elaimed that firm performance impacts large 
shareholder ownership in a simultaneous framework but no evidenee to support the 
notion that variations across firms in observed ownership structures lead to systematic 
variations in firm performance. Loderer & Martin (1997) also tested the relationship 
between insider ownership and firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q using
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acquisition data which includes 867 firms between 1978-1988. They reported that insider 
ownership decreases signifieantly with Tobin’s Q but the reverse is not evidenced. 
Nevertheless, treating institutional ownership endogenously. Clay (2001) provided 
empirical evidence showing that institutional ownership increases firm value as measured 
hy a proxy for Tobin’s Q. His study will be reviewed in the next seetion of this chapter.
Empirical Studies on the Institutional Ownership 
and Firm Performanee Relationship 
Agrawal & Knoeber (1996) examined firm performance and seven mechanisms to 
control agency problems between managers and shareholders based on a list o f 383 
Fortune 800 firms in 1987. In their study firm performance was measured by a simple Q 
devised by Perfeet & Wiles (1994). Agrawal & Knoeber (1996) first regressed firm 
performanee on the entire set o f control mechanisms using OLS and later considered 
inter-correlation among the control mechanisms, incorporating firm performance and all 
the control mechanisms in a simultaneous equations framework using 2SLS. They found 
institutional ownership, one tested mechanism, an insignificant determinant o f firm 
performance in both the OLS and 2SLS results. In addition, only board composition out 
o f all the seven control mechanisms examined had a signifieant impaet on firm 
performance echoing Demsetz & Lehn’s (1985) study that choices o f control mechanisms 
are made so as to maximize firm value. Other firm speeific control variables included 
were firm size by log of total assets, R&D expenditures to total assets, advertising 
expenditures to total assets and dummy variables for regulated firms and those listed on 
NYSE.
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In an attempt to examine institutional investors’ potential influence on the firm’s 
capital structure and the firm’s financial performance, Chaganti & Damanpour (1991) 
examined 40 pairs o f firms in 40 industries in the U.S. manufacturing sector continuously 
surveyed by the Value Line  between 1983-1985. Firms with the highest and lowest 
three-year average institutional shareholdings in each o f the 40 industries were selected 
for a total o f 80 firms in their study. Long-term debt as a percentage o f the firm’s total 
capital was used as a measure o f the firm’s capital structure, while four accounting 
measures, namely, the percentage o f return on assets (ROA) measuring the efficiency 
with which total assets are managed, the percentage of return on equity (ROE) measuring 
the efficiency with which shareholders’ investments are managed, the price/eamings (P/E) 
ratio reflecting a relative value o f the firm’s stock in the market and, lastly, percentage of 
total stock returns capturing income to shareholders in the form of dividends and capital 
gains, were used as financial performance measures. The results o f their study showed 
that all four financial measures for the group with the highest institutional ownership are 
higher than those for the group with the lowest institutional ownership; however, only the 
difference between the two groups on ROE is statistically significant. Furthermore, 
institutional ownership was found to help lower the long-term debt-to-capital ratio. This 
implies that institutional shareholders may serve as efficient monitoring agents in lieu of 
creditors.
In probing the relationship between institutional ownership and firm performance 
where institutional ownership was treated endogenously, Clay (2001) examined 8,951 
firms between 1988-1999. He found empirical evidence supporting a positive impact of 
institutional ownership on firm performance, as measured by proxy Q, not only in the
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OLS model but also in a simultaneous equations framework using the 2SLS technique. 
Specifically, Clay’s (2001) results suggested that a one percent increase in institutional 
ownership translates to a 0.75% enhancement in firm performance. Proxy Q in his study 
was calculated as:
Proxy 0 =  (ASSET + E Q U IT Y -(CE+ DT))
j\ssEnr
where,
ASSET : the book value of total assets;
EQUITY : the market value o f equity;
CE: the book value of common equity; and,
DT: deferred taxes.
In particular, this proxy Q has been empirically used by previous researchers
(Gompers et al., 2003; Kaplan & Zingales, 1997) and will be adopted in this dissertation
to measure firm performance in the hospitality industry. The S&P 500 Index was used as
an instrumental variable for institutional ownership in Clay’s (2001) study. Other control
variables included firm size by log o f sales, firm age, time trend, R&D expenditures to
total assets, and industry membership. No reverse impact of firm performance on
institutional ownership was assessed in his study.
Craswell et al. (1997) examined the effect o f institutional ownership on firm
performance with two cross-sectional Australian samples, further divided by firm size,
for 1986 and 1989 respectively. A total o f 82 large and 81 small firms in the 1986
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sub-sample and 95 large and 91 small firms in 1989 formed the four groups. Firm 
performance was measured by a proxy for Tobin’s Q and was defined as the ratio of 
market value o f equity to book value of net assets. Craswell et al. (1997) first regressed 
their proxy Q on insider ownership and insider ownership squared, and later added 
institutional ownership as an additional explanatory variable to the regression equation in 
the four groups. They failed to find any empirical evidence supporting the hypothetic 
relationship between institutional ownership and firm performance. Other control 
variables included in the performance equation were financial leverage measured by debt 
ratio, firm size by log o f total assets, R&D expenditures to total assets and industry 
membership dummy variables.
Using long-term stock returns as a measure of firm performance for 301 
NYSE/AMEX firms during 1988-1992, Han & Suck (1998) examined the effect o f 
insider ownership and institutional ownership simultaneously on firm performance while 
other variables (e.g., size o f the firm, eamings/price ratio) that may cause spurious 
relationships between interested variables were controlled. They found that stock returns, 
represented by the geometric average return for the five year period for the firms, are 
positively related to institutional ownership at the 10% significance level. Han & Suck 
(1998) further divided the sample into three sub-samples representing the high, medium 
and low institutional ownership groups, and institutional ownership was still found to he 
a significant determinant o f firm performance as evidenced by the F test and 
Kruskal-Wallis test conducted. They attributed this observed significant relationship to 
effective monitoring o f firm management by institutional investors.
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In investigating the relationship between executive ownership and firm performance 
in the context o f 867 acquisitions o f puhlicly-traded firms in the U.S. between 1978-1988, 
Loderer & Martin (1997) estimated a simultaneous equations model where insider 
ownership by managers and directors and firm performance measured by a simple Q  
(Perfect & Wiles, 1994) were the two dependent variables for the two equations 
respectively. Institutional ownership, added as an additional explanatory variable in the 
performance equation in addition to other control variables, was not found to be a 
significant determinant o f firm performance. Other control variables included in the study 
were logarithmic transformation o f net sales measuring firm size, industry membership 
dummy variables, and standard deviation of stock returns.
McConnell & Servaes (1990) hypothesized that the value o f a firm is a function of the 
distribution of equity ownership among corporate insiders, individual atomistic 
shareholders, block shareholders and institutional investors. They tested their hypothesis 
using a cross-sectional sample o f 1,173 firms listed on NYSE/AMEX in 1976 and 
another 1,093 firms in 1986. In their study, McConnell & Servaes (1990) employed a 
proxy for Tobin’s g  as a measure for firm performance. Their proxy for Tobin’s Q was 
similar to what Chung & Pruitt (1994) proposed, although McConnell & Servaes (1990) 
used the replacement value o f total assets in the denominator. The control variables 
included along with the ownership variables in the regression equation were financial 
leverage measured as the market value of debt divided by the replacement value o f total 
assets, R&D intensity measured as R&D expenditures for the year divided by the 
replacement value o f total assets, advertising intensity measured as advertising 
expenditures divided by the replacement value o f total assets, and, lastly, the replacement
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value of total assets representing firm size. The results o f McConnell & Servaes’ (1990) 
study showed a significant and positive impact o f institutional ownership on firm 
performance. They further claimed that such a relationship reveals an efficient 
monitoring role assumed by institutional investors.
Heterogeneous Institutions and Firm Performance 
As mentioned in Chapter One, different types o f institutions reveal different 
investment behaviors and pursue diverse objectives subject to various conditions and 
constraints. That is, considering the heterogeneity o f institutions when modeling the 
institutional ownership/firm performance relationship may reveal different results subject 
to institution types, objectives and incentive structures, as opposed to previous studies 
treating all institutions as homogenous.
In examining the relationship between firm performance, as measured by adjusted Q, 
and two types o f pension funds—pubhc and private, using a pooled sample o f 359 
Fortune 500 firms between 1989-1993, Woidtke (2002) found that adjusted Q is 
positively related to ownership by private pension funds but negatively related to 
ownership by public pension funds using 2SLS in a simultaneous equations framework. 
She argued that the positive effect associated with private pension funds is consistent 
with the larger, more performance-based compensation for private pension fund 
administrators leading to a convergence o f interests with other shareholders, while the 
negative effect associated with public pension fund ownership is driven by the ownership 
o f public pension funds that focus on firms with poor corporate governance issues. 
Adjusted Q equals to a firm’s Tobin’s Q less the median Q for its industry. Other control 
variables included were financial leverage measured by debt ratio, R&D expenditures to
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total assets, advertising expenditures to total assets and firm replacement value (Woidtke, 
2 0 0 2 ^
A summary o f previous empirical studies on the institutional ownership/firm 
performance relationship is presented in Table 1.
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Author Sample & Period
Institutional
Ownership
Variable
Performance
Measure
Control Variable StatisticalMethod
Ownership
Endogenous? Results
Agrawal &
Knoeber
(1996)
383 Fortune 
800 firms in 
1987
The
percentage of 
shares held by 
institutions
Simple Q (1) Firm size by log of 
total assets;
(2) R&D expenditures to 
total assets;
(3) Advertising 
expenditures to total assets;
(4) dummy variables for 
regulated & NYSE listed 
firms
OLS & 2SLS Yes No relationship 
between institutional 
ownership & firm 
performance for both 
OLS & 2SLS
Chaganti & 
Damanpour 
(1991)
80 U.S. 
manufacturing 
firms between 
1983-1985
The
percentage of 
shares held by 
institutions
(1) Return on 
assets (ROA);
(2) Return on 
equity (ROE);
(3) Price/eamings 
(P/E) ratio;
G) Percentage of 
stock returns
Stockholdings by 
corporate executives
Hierarchical
multiple
regression
No Performance 
measures are higher 
for the group with 
higher institutional 
ownership
Clay (2001) 8,951 firms
between
1988-1999
The
percentage of 
shares held by 
institutions
Proxy Q (1) Firm size by log of 
sales;
(2) Time trend;
(3) Firm age;
(4) R&D expenditures to 
total assets
OLS & 2SLS Yes Institutional 
ownership has 
positive impact on 
firm performance; no 
reverse relationship 
was assessed
Craswell, 
Taylor & 
Saywell 
(1997)
349 Australian 
firms in 1986 
& 19 M
The
percentage of 
shares held by 
institutions
Proxy for Tobin’s
Q
(1) Financial leverage by 
debt ratio;
(2) Firm size by log of 
total assets;
(3) R&D expenditures to 
total assets;
(4) Industry membership 
dummy variable
Linear &
curvilinear
regression
No No relationship 
between institutional 
ownership & firm 
performance
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Han &
Suck (1998)
301
NYSE/AMEX
firms
The
percentage of 
shares held by 
institutions
Long-term stock 
returns
(1) Systematic risk (beta);
(2) Firm size by log of 
market value of equity;
(3) E/P ratio
Weighted
least-squares
No Institutional 
ownership has 
positive impact on 
firm performance
Loderer &
Martin
(1997)
867 U.S. firms
between
1978-1988
The
percentage of 
shares held by 
institutions
Simple Q (1) Firm size by log of net 
sales;
(2) Industry membership 
dummy variable;
(3) S.D. o f stock returns
OLS & 2SLS Yes No relationship 
between institutional 
ownership & firm 
performance
McCormell 
& Servaes 
(1990)
2,266
NYSE/AMEX 
firms in 1976 
& 1 9 M
The
percentage of 
shares held by 
institutions
Proxy for Tobin’s
Ô
(1) Financial leverage by 
debt ratio;
(2) R&D expenditures to 
total assets;
(3) Advertising 
expenditures to total 
assets;
(4) the replacement value 
o f total assets
OLS No Institutional 
ownership has 
positive impact on 
firm performance
Woidtke
(2002)
1,765 Fortune 
500 firms 
between 
1989-1993
The
percentage of 
shares held by 
private and 
public pension 
funds
Adjusted Tobin’s (1) Financial leverage by 
debt ratio;
(2) R&D expenditures to 
total assets;
(3) Advertising 
expenditures to total 
assets;
(4) the replacement value 
o f total assets
2SLS Yes Private pension funds 
have positive impact 
on firm performance 
while public pension 
funds have negative 
impact on firm 
performance
C/)
C /)
Summary
Previous research on the relationship between institutional ownership and firm 
performance has shown mixed results as to the direction of causality, the treatment of 
ownership structure endogeneity, the monitoring role o f institutional investors, the 
industries investigated, the control variables selected, and the time period sampled. The 
review of related literature guides the direction o f this dissertation in examining the 
institutional ownership/firm performance relationship in the hospitality industry, and the 
next chapter will focus on the methodology.
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY
The review of the existing literature in Chapter Two provides both a theoretical and 
empirical foundation for variable selection and statistical technique adoption in this 
dissertation for testing the relationship between institutional ownership and firm 
performance in the hospitality industry. Ownership endogeneity argued by Demsetz 
(1983) and evidenced by other empirical studies (e.g., Clay, 2001) suggests simultaneous 
determination of institutional ownership and firm performance. Furthermore, Demsetz & 
Villalonga (2001) suggested that firm performance is at least as likely to affect ownership 
structure as ownership structure is to affect firm performance. That is, a simultaneous 
equations system consisting o f two equations, with institutional ownership and firm 
performance as the dependent variables will be estimated using the 2SLS technique if 
deemed proper. In a system comprised of interdependent endogenous variables, the 2SLS 
technique is preferred over OLS as the latter would lead to biased and inconsistent 
parameter estimates (Wooldridge, 2003). The first section o f this chapter will present the 
hypotheses constructed for this dissertation, and the next several sections will then 
describe the development o f the proposed model, the statistical techniques adopted, the 
underlying assumptions for the statistical techniques, and the sample and data used for
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testing the model. Lastly, the proposed model will be tested using the data collected for 
the three sectors (i.e., restaurant, casino and hotel) o f the hospitality industry.
Hypotheses
In consideration o f the research questions stated in Chapter One and in review of 
related literature in Chapter Two, the following hypotheses will be tested in this 
dissertation:
HYPOTHESIS I:
HYPOTHESIS II:
HYPOTHESIS III:
Institutional ownership will have a positive impact on firm 
performance in the restaurant sector;
Institutional ownership will have a positive impact on firm 
performance in the casino sector; and.
Institutional ownership will have a positive impact on firm 
performance in the hotel sector.
The Proposed Simultaneous Equations Model 
In view of the research questions o f whether institutional ownership influences firm 
performance in the hospitality industry and in consideration o f potential firm-specific 
variables that might influence firm performance, the first proposed equation [Eq. (1)], 
employing firm performance as the dependent variable and institutional ownership as one 
o f the independent variables, is described as follows:
e  = po + pi INST + P2SIZE + P3DEBT + P4FIX + £,,
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where,
Q\ proxy Q\
INST : the percentage o f outstanding shares held by institutions;
SIZE; log o f total assets;
DEBT : the book value o f debt as a fraction o f the book value of total assets;
FIX: expenditures on fixed plant and equipment as a fraction of sales revenues;
Po: constant;
P1-P4: coefficient; and,
£] : error term.
Here, employing proxy Q as the performance measure, Eq. (1) is a natural OLS 
equation with INST as one o f the independent variables, along with other firm-specific 
control variables including SIZE, DEBT, and FIX. However, OLS estimation alone in Eq.
( 1) will be inconsistent and biased if  it contains at least one endogenous explanatory 
variable (Wooldridge, 2003). Due to the suspicious endogeneity of the institutional 
ownership variable (i.e., INST) as evidenced in some previous studies (e.g.. Clay, 2001) 
that may produce inconsistent and biased coefficient estimates in Eq. (1), a second OLS 
model [Eq. (2)], with INST as the dependent variable and Q and other firm-specific 
variables including SIZE, ROA, BETA, DEBT and DIV as the independent variables, is 
specified and described as follows:
IN S T  =  po +  P1Ô +  P2SIZE +  P3RO A +  P4BETA  +  PsD EB T +  PeDIV +  £2, (2 )
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where,
INST: the percentage o f outstanding shares held by institutions; 
g : proxy g ;
SIZE: log o f total assets;
ROA: net income divided by total assets;
BETA: systematic risk;
DEBT: the book value o f debt as a fraction o f the book value of total assets;
DIV: dividend payout ratio;
Po: constant;
Pi_p6 : coefficient; and,
£2: error term.
The independent variables in Eq. (2) not only act as potential determinants o f 
institutional ownership for hospitality firms, but, more importantly, some of them play 
the role of instrumental variables for INST in the first stage o f the 2SLS technique if 
2SLS is deemed proper for this dissertation. Thus, a simultaneous two-equation model 
consisting o f Eqs. (1) and (2) is specified. The reasons for selecting the specific 
independent variables will be provided later in the subsection 0 0  Independent Variables. 
The simultaneous equations model is essentially a combination o f two OLS models in a 
simultaneous framework where Q and INST are the two interdependent endogenous 
variables jointly determined in the system. A graphical representation of the proposed 
simultaneous equations model is shown in Figure 1.
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Figure I . The Proposed Simultaneous Equations Model 
Dependent Variables
The two dependent variables are a proxy for Tobin’s Q  (i.e., proxy Q) in Eq. (1) and 
institutional ownership (i.e., INST) in Eq. (2). Due to a possible distortion from the 
estimation of replacement costs of total assets when calculating Tobin’s Q  using the L-R 
procedures, a proxy for Tobin’s Q, as widely used by previous studies (Clay 2001; 
Gompers et al., 2003; Kaplan & Zingales, 1997), was used as a measure o f firm 
performance in this dissertation. Proxy Q is defined as follows:
Proxy Q  = (ASSET + EQUITY -  (CE + DT)) 
ASSET
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where, ASSET is the book value o f total assets, EQUITY is the market value o f common 
equity, CE is the book value o f common equity, and DT is deferred taxes.
Institutional ownership (INST) is defined as the year-end percentage of outstanding 
ordinary shares o f firms owned by financial institutions. Institutional investment 
managers are required to report their shareholdings in Form 13F to the SEC quarterly if 
they exercise investment discretion o f $100 million or more in Section 13(f) securities 
(U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2004). Section 13(f) securities generally 
include equity securities that trade on an exchange or are quoted on the National 
Association o f Securities Dealers Automated Quotation (NASDAQ), equity options and 
warrants, shares o f closed-end investment companies, and convertible bonds. Form 13F 
requires disclosure o f the names o f institutional investment managers, the names and 
classes of the securities managed, the Committee on Uniform Securities Identification 
Procedures (CUSIP) number, the number o f shares owned, and the total market value of 
each security (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2004).
In addition, INST and Q also serve as possible endogenous, or pure exogenous, 
explanatory variables in Eqs. (1) and (2).
Independent Variables 
When examining the relationship between institutional ownership and firm 
performance, various firm-specific characteristics should be controlled for the possibility 
o f their causing spurious correlation between institutional ownership and firm 
performance (Welch, 2003). One way o f controlling firm-specific characteristics is to 
include and model them together with the interested variables (i.e., Q and INST). All the
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independent variables discussed below are control variables and are used in either one or 
both of Eqs. (1) and (2).
Firm size (SIZE), measured by log o f total assets, is included in both Eqs. (1) and (2) 
to account for the possibility that firm size may affect firm performance, institutional 
ownership or both. The amount o f total assets may vary from firm to firm, and large 
discrepancies may exist among different firms. Logarithmic transformation o f total assets 
can stretch extremely small values and condense extremely large values o f total assets 
and make data more normally distributed (Clark, 1984). Transformation o f data also 
reduces the impact of outliers (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). For Eq. (1), since growth 
opportunities and Tobin’s Q are likely lower for larger firms (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996) 
and firm size was found negatively related to firm performance in previous studies 
(Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Craswell et al., 1997; Crutchley et al., 1999; McConnell & 
Servaes, 1990; Morck et ah, 1988; Woidtke, 2002), a negative relationship between 
proxy Q and firm size is expected. For Eq. (2), previous studies (Crutchley et al., 1999; 
Herman, 1981; O ’Brien & Bhushan, 1990) showed that institutional investors are more 
likely to buy stocks o f large firms, possibly due to the fact that those firms have the 
resources and capacity to reduce the risk o f their investment in projects and are less 
subject to risk o f bankruptcy (Tong & Ning, 2004). Thus, a positive relationship between 
institutional ownership and firm size is anticipated.
Debt ratio (DEBT), representing firm leverage and calculated as total debt divided by 
total assets, is included in both Eqs. (1) and (2). For Eq. (1), first, debt ratio serves to 
capture a value-enhancing effect o f corporate tax shields that could result in higher values 
o f performance indicators, including Tobin’s Q (Morck et al., 1988). Second, as
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suggested by the pecking order theory, well-performing firms in terms of their 
profitability are likely to be less-leveraged because they tend to finance their future 
projects with internally generated earnings first (Morck et ah, 1988; Myers & Majluf, 
1984; Tong & Ning, 2004; Welch, 2003). Lastly, debt ratio can further capture a 
value-enhancing (reducing) effect when future interest payment obligations are paid back 
with relatively less (more) valuable money than was borrowed when a relative inflation 
(deflation) was observed (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001). Therefore, either a positive or a 
negative relationship between firm leverage and firm performance can be expected in Eq.
(1). For Eq. (2), firm leverage may serve, on the one hand, as the level o f monitoring of 
firm management provided by creditors that otherwise would have come from equity 
holders (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001). On the other hand, firm leverage may serve as a 
signal o f possible bankruptcy risk o f the firm. A highly-leveraged firm may discourage 
institutional investors from holding shares o f such firm, and, therefore, a negative effect 
o f debt leverage on INST is projected.
Accounting distortion can also arise from how fixed assets (e.g., plant & equipment) 
are depreciated over their useful life (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001). Different 
depreciation methods (e.g., straight-line, sum of the years digit, etc.) can yield different 
book values o f the same fixed assets and possibly distort proxy Q, in that the book value 
of total assets represents the denominator o f proxy Q. Expenditures on fixed plant and 
equipment, or capital expenditures, as a fraction o f sales revenues (FDC) is therefore also 
included in Eq. (1) as in other studies (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001; Welch, 2003) and 
can either result in a positive or a negative impact on proxy Q.
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ROA, defined as net income divided by total assets measuring firm profitability, is 
included in Eq. (2) to show whether institutional investors are more attracted to firms 
with higher profitability. O’Barr & Conley (1992) argued that financial institutions tend 
to invest in highly profitable firms so as to fulfill their fiduciary duty to their investors, 
and their argument was supported empirically by Crutchley et al. (1999). Therefore, in Eq.
(2) a positive relationship between ROA and INST is expected.
BETA, or the systematic risk o f a firm’s stock, is included in Eq. (2) to represent the 
undiversifiable portion o f the investment risk inherent in stock ownership that may affect 
institutional investors’ decision to hold a certain stock. O ’Brien and Bhushan (1990) 
found that BETA is positively related to institutional ownership possibly because 
institutional investors have incentives to invest in high-risk securities for higher return on 
their portfolios, hence higher compensation for themselves. However, Crutchley et al. 
(1999) found evidence that institutional ownership and BETA are negatively related in 
their 1987 sample and positively related in 1993. Therefore, either a positive or a 
negative relationship between INST and BETA may be expected in Eq. (2).
DIV, representing dividend payout ratio and estimated as dividends divided by 
income before extraordinary items adjusted for common stock equivalents 
(COMPUSTAT, 2003), is included in Eq. (2) to show whether dividend payouts would 
influence institutional investors’ decision to hold a firm’s stock. On the one hand, 
institutional investors seek a higher return, including dividend income, to carry out their 
fiduciary duty. Empirical evidence has shown that a higher dividend payout ratio leads to 
larger institutional ownership (Allen, Bernardo & Welch, 2000; Crutchley et al., 1999; 
Short, Zhang & Keasey, 2002). Grinstein & Michaely (2005) also reported that
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institutional investors prefer dividend-paying firms to non-dividend-paying ones, but 
among firms that pay dividends, lower-dividend-paying firms are favored. On the other 
hand, a negative relationship may also be expected since institutional investors may 
prefer firms that retain earnings for future reinvestment purposes rather than pay high 
levels o f dividends, possibly due, in part, to dual-taxation on dividend income that might 
have caused institutions to prefer low/no dividend (Tong & Ning, 2004). Table 2 shows 
expected signs o f the coefficients o f the independent/explanatory variables in Eqs. (1) 
and (2 ).
Table 2 Expected Signs o f the Coefficients o f Explanatory Variables
Eq. (1) Eq. (2)
Dependent Variable INST
Explanatory Variable
Ô -t-
INST +
SIZE - 4-
DEBT + /- -
FIX + /-
ROA -h
BETA + /-
DIV + /-
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Statistical Techniques 
All statistical techniques will be performed with the assistance o f SPSS software 
version 11.0. The following sections will describe the statistical techniques adopted for 
this dissertation.
The Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test 
Previous studies suggest the use o f the 2SLS technique when modeling the ownership 
structure/firm performance relationship because o f the endogeneity o f ownership 
structure in the firm. Thus, in this dissertation, the suspicious endogenous variable, 
institutional ownership, will be tested first for endogeneity before applying the 2SLS 
technique to the proposed model. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test for checking the 
endogeneity o f INST in Eq. (1) will be performed to justify the use o f 2SLS in the 
equation (Davidson & MacKinnon, 1993). If the DWH test suggests that INST is an 
endogenous explanatory variable in Eq. (1), meaning it is correlated with the error term 
of Eq. (1), 2SLS will be applied to estimate the equation; otherwise, OLS estimation 
alone on Eq. (1) will suffice. In a similar vein, Q in Eq. (2) may be an endogenous 
explanatory variable, and, therefore, the DWH test will also be performed on Q to justify 
the use of 2SLS in the equation.
The DWH test will be performed in two steps using the following sample 
simultaneous equations (3) and (4).
Yi =ao + ai*Y2 + a2*Xi-4ei, (3)
Y2 = bo+ b]*X2 + b2*X3 + 0 2 , (4)
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where, Y] is a suspicious endogenous variable and Y| is the dependent variable in Eq. (3), 
Xi, X2 and X3 are exogenous variables and e, and 02 are the error terms. The first step of 
the DWH test is to perform a regression in which the suspicious endogenous variable (i.e., 
Y2) regresses against all exogenous variables (i.e., X,, X2 , and X 3) in the system; or
Y2 =  Co +  Cl *Xi + C2*X 2 +  C3*X3 +  63, (5)
and residuals o f Eq. (5), Y2_res, are saved. In the second step, Y2_res is added as an 
additional independent variable to Eq. (3) and another regression is performed; or
Y i  =  d o  +  d i * Y 2  +  d 2 * X ,  +  d 3Y 2_ r e s  +  04, ( 6 )
If ds, the coefficient o f Y2_res, is significantly different from zero in a t-test, meaning 
Y2 is an endogenous explanatory variable correlating with the error term of Eq. (3), OLS 
estimation on Eq. (3) is both inconsistent and biased, and, therefore, 2SLS is necessary 
(Cong, 2004).
Using Eqs. (1) and (2) in this study for illustration, firstly, an OLS regression is run 
where the suspicious “endogenous” variable, or INST, is regressed against all six 
exogenous variables in Eqs. (1) and (2), namely SIZE, DEBT, FIX, ROA, BETA and 
DIV, and the residuals (i.e., INST res) are saved; or
E 4 S T  =  po +  Pi S IZ E  +  P2D EB T +  P3FIX +  P4ROA +  P5BETA +  PeDIV, (7 )
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Secondly, INST res obtained from Eq. (7) is then added to Eq. (1) as an additional 
independent variable and another OLS regression is run; or
0  =  Po + PiINST + P2SIZE + P3D EBT +  P4FIX + p5lNST_res, (8 )
If the coefficient o f INST res obtained from Eq. (8 ), or P$, is significantly different 
from zero in a t-test, the OLS result obtained from Eq. (1) will be both inconsistent and 
biased, and, therefore, the use o f the 2SLS technique is justified and should be applied to 
Eq. (1) (Cong, 2004). Since the DWH test is not a built-in function of SPSS, manual 
operation o f the DWH test is performed with the assistance o f SPSS’s linear regression 
function.
Two-Stage Least Squares Technique
After performing the DWH test, if  INST is found to be an endogenous explanatory 
variable in Eq. (1), the 2SLS technique will be employed in estimating the coefficients in 
the equation. Similarly, the 2SLS technique will be adopted in Eq. (2) if  Q is found to be 
endogenous. The following simultaneous equations (9) and (10) serve as an example for 
illustration of the 2SLS technique:
Yi = po + P1Y2 + P2Z 1 + ei, (9)
Y2 = Po + PiY] + P2Z1 + P3Z2+ P4Z3 + 62, (10)
where, Y2 is an endogenous explanatory variable in Eq. (9), Z,, Z2 and Z3 are exogenous 
variables and e, and 02 are the error terms.
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The first stage is to run an OLS regression in which Yi is the dependent variable and 
Zi, Z2 and Z3 are the independent variables; or
Y2 = Po + PiZi + P2Z2+P3Z3 + 63, (11)
and the predicted (fitted) values o f Y2, denoted as Y^, are obtained from Eq. (11). The 
first stage serves to find a 2SLS estimator for Y2 (i.e., Y  ̂) in Eq. (9) using all exogenous 
variables (i.e., Xi, X% and X3) as instrumental variables.
In the second stage, o f Eq. (9), Y2 is replaced by and another OLS regression is 
then run on Eq. (9); or
Yi = Po + PiY; + P2Z] + C], ( 1 2 )
The estimation of the coefficient in Eq. (12) is now both consistent and unbiased 
(Wooldridge, 2003).
Next, Eqs. (1) and (2) in this dissertation are used for illustration. In the first stage,
the predicted (fitted) values o f INST, or INST (i.e., the 2SLS estimator), are obtained 
by regressing INST against all exogenous variables in Eqs. (1) and (2)— SIZE, DEBT, 
FIX, ROA, BETA and DIV; or
INST = po + pi SIZE + P2DEBT + P3FIX + P4ROA + PsBETA + PeDIV + fi. (13)
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In the second stage, of Eq. (1), EMST is replaced by INST and another OLS 
regression is run on Eq. (1); or
6  =  po +  P i INST + P 2SIZE + p3DEBT + p4FIX + f,. (14)
The estimation o f the coefficient in Eq. (14) is then both consistent and unbiased 
(Wooldridge, 2003).
In SPSS, the 2SLS technique is performed using a built-in 2SES regression function 
where three mandatory lists are required for input; the dependent variable, the list o f 
explanatory variables (both exogenous and endogenous), and the entire list o f 
instrumental variables (i.e., all exogenous variables). 2SLS regression output is similar to 
that for OLS (Wooldridge, 2003).
Assumptions o f The Two-Stage Least Squares
The 2SLS technique is not performed without assumptions. Since the 2SLS technique 
is essentially an OLS regression with a 2SLS estimator performed in two stages, the 
underlying assumptions that apply to OLS should also be checked when applying the 
2SLS technique. The assumption of normality states that the errors (or the dependent 
variable) has a normal distribution, conditional on the explanatory variables; the 
assumption o f linearity states that there is a straight-line relationship between two 
variables (where one or both o f the variables can be combinations o f several variables); 
and the assumption of homoscedasticity states that the errors in a regression model have 
constant variance, conditional on the explanatory variables (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001 ; 
Wooldridge, 2003). Under OLS, assumptions such as normality, linearity and
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homoscedasticity o f  residuals can be examined by residuals scatterplots in which one axis 
is predicted scores o f the dependent variable and the other axis is errors o f prediction 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). The same tool will be applied under 2SLS in this study to 
examine normality, linearity and homoscedasticity.
Another relevant assumption for the 2SLS technique is the identification issue for the 
equations. Over-identification or just-identification (exact-identification) o f equations is 
both necessary (i.e., order condition) and sufficient (i.e., rank condition) for the 2SLS 
technique to produce consistent estimators o f the P coefficient (Wooldridge, 2003). The 
order condition for identification o f an equation means that there exists at least as many 
excluded exogenous variables as there are included endogenous explanatory variables in 
the equation (Wooldridge, 2003). An equation is over-identified when the number of 
excluded exogenous variables is larger than that o f right-hand endogenous explanatory 
variables, while an equation is just-identified when the number o f excluded exogenous 
variables is equal to that o f right-hand endogenous explanatory variables. On the other 
hand, the rank condition for identification states that the first equation in a two-equation 
simultaneous system is identified if, and only if, the second equation includes at least one 
exogenous variable excluded from the first equation and the coefficient o f the excluded 
exogenous variable is not zero (Wooldridge, 2003).
In this dissertation, Q and INST are the two endogenous variables while the six 
exogenous variables are SIZE, DEBT, FIX, ROA, BETA and DIV. Eq. (1) is 
over-identified and Eq. (2) is just-identified, because the number o f excluded exogenous 
variables from the equations is at least as large as the number o f right-hand endogenous 
variables (Wooldridge, 2003). In other words, in Eq. (1), only SIZE, DEBT, and FIX are
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included as exogenous explanatory variables, and, therefore, ROA, BETA and DIV are 
considered three excluded exogenous variables from the equation with INST being the 
endogenous explanatory variable on the right-hand side of the equation. The number of 
excluded exogenous variables (i.e., ROA, BETA and DIV) is larger than that of 
right-hand endogenous variable (i.e., INST), resulting in over-identification o f Eq. (1). 
Similarly, in Eq. (2), FIX is not included and therefore is considered an excluded 
exogenous variable while Q is the endogenous one. The number o f excluded exogenous 
variables (i.e., FIX) is equal to that o f right-hand endogenous variables (i.e., Q), resulting 
in just-identification of Eq. (2). Furthermore, the rank condition for identification for Eq.
( 1) can be checked only after data analysis if  at least one of the excluded exogenous 
variables from Eq. (1) has a non-zero coefficient in Eq. (2). That is, the rank condition for 
identification is met for Eq. (1) if  at least one of the coefficients for ROA, BETA and 
DIV in Eq. (2) is non-zero. Similarly, the rank condition for identification is met for Eq.
(2) if  the coefficient for FIX in Eq. (1) is not zero.
Multicollinearitv
One o f the underlying assumptions for linear regression models states that there is no 
exact linear relationship between the independent variables in the equation. However, the 
issue of multicollinearity is said to exist when two or more independent variables are 
approximately linearly-related in the sample data (Kennedy, 2003). Although the OLS 
estimator in the presence of multicollinearity remains unbiased and the R-squared is 
unaffected, the variances o f the OLS estimates of the parameters o f the collinear variables 
are quite large (Kennedy, 2003). The variance of the coefficient for Xj is calculated as:
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where, is the error variance, SSTj is the total sample variations in variable Xj and Rj  ̂is 
the variations in Xj explained by other independent variables. When serious 
multicollinearity exists, larger variances o f the OLS estimates o f the parameters will 
result in smaller t statistics and make it harder to reject the null hypothesis. In other 
words, it will be more likely to commit a Type II error under serious multicollinearity 
(Neter, Kutner, Nachtsheim & Wasserman, 1996). Multicollinearity is not deemed a 
“problem” by some scholars since it can be eliminated by increasing sample size; thus, 
increasing SSTj in Eq. (15). More importantly, the parameter of interest may be 
uncorrelated with other collinear variables that will not affect the variance of the 
interested parameter.
Nevertheless, multicollinearity can be more serious with 2SES than OLS
(Wooldridge, 2003), and this can be illustrated using Eqs. (13) and (14). INST are 
predicted (fitted) values obtained from Eq. (13) that is essentially a linear combination o f 
all six exogenous variables (SIZE, DEBT, FIX, ROA, BETA and DIV). That is, the
variations in INST can be perfectly explained by the six exogenous variables. INST, 
acting as a 2SLS estimator in place o f INST, will be possibly correlated with SIZE,
DEBT, and FIX in Eq. (14) because INST are predicted (fitted) values from Eq. (13). 
Thus, serious multicollinearity in Eq. (14) may exist. However, there is no guideline for 
how multicollinearity in a 2 SES regression model can be detected. No statistics such as
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variance inflation factors (VIF), condition index or Pearson correlation matrix are 
available under the 2SLS function in SPSS.
Sample and Data
For this study, the sample consists o f firms from the three major hospitality 
sectors—restaurant, casino and hotel. All sample firms were firstly identified with their 
primary North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code numbers. 
Specifically, the restaurant sector includes firms under NAICS code number 722110 (i.e.. 
Full-service restaurants) or 722211 (i.e., Limited-service restaurants); the casino sector 
covers firms under NAICS code number 713210 (i.e.. Casinos) or 721120 (i.e.. Casino 
Hotels); and the hotel sector includes firms with NAICS code number 721110 (Hotels & 
Motels). Secondly, the identified firms whose institutional investors’ investment portfolio 
meeting the SEC’s Form 13F reporting requirements (i.e., portfolio fair market value 
equal to or over $100 million) between 1999-2003 were targeted and pooled. The sample 
was then narrowed depending upon accounting and financial information and institutional 
ownership data availability from the data sources.
The choice o f period 1999-2003 for this dissertation was based on two considerations. 
Firstly, there are not as many publicly traded firms in the hospitality industry as in other 
manufacturing industries. The number o f firm observations in one single year may not be 
able to produce any meaningful or valid results when employing statistical techniques 
such as linear regression. Pooled data o f more than one year were thus used for the 
empirical investigation in this study. Secondly, a preliminary data screening shows that 
institutional ownership information for hospitality firms before 1999 was relatively
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limited. Therefore, a pooled sample of hospitality firms in time period of five years 
between 1999-2003 was adopted.
The accounting and financial information o f  those firms for 1999-2003 was obtained 
from Standard & Poor’s COMPUSTAT, Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), 
and institutional ownership information for the same period was gathered from Thomson 
Financial. Accounting information that was collected is based upon the variables included 
in the proposed model. A list o f accounting and financial variables collected from 
Standard & Poor’s COMPUSTAT database is shown in Table 3.
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Table 3 Variables Collected from S&P’s COMPUSTAT between 1999-2003
Variable Description Acronym
DATA6 Total Assets (MM$) CST6
DATA9 Long-term Debt (MM$) CST9
DATAI 2 Net Sales (MM$)
Income before Extraordinary Items
CST12
DATA20 Adjusted for Common Stock 
Equivalents (MM$)
CST20
DATA2 1 Common Dividends (MM$) CST21
DATA24 Year-end Stock Close Price ($&C) CST24
DATA25 Common shares Outstanding (MM) CST25
DATA30
Capital Expenditures on Property, 
Plant & Equipment (MM$)
CST30
DATA34 Debt in Current Liabilities (MM$) CST34
DATA60 Total Common Equity (MM$) CST60
DATA74
Deferred Taxes on Balance Sheet 
(MM$)
CST74
DATA 172 Net Income (MM$) CST172
Note: MM is millions; MM$ is millions o f dollars; $&C is dollars and cents.
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Table 4 shows computation of the variables included in the proposed model [i.e., Eqs. 
(1) and (2)] using COMPUSTAT data collected for this dissertation. Year-end BETA 
values o f the sample firms were collected from CRSP.
Table 4 Computation o f the Variables in the Proposed Model
Variable COMPUSTAT data used in computation Eq. (1) Eq. (2)
Proxy Q
(CST6 + (CST24 x CST25) -  (CST60 + CST74))
CST6
V V
SIZE log(CST6) V V
DEBT
(CST9 + CST34) 
CST6
V V
FIX
(CST30)
(CST12)
V
ROA
(CST172)
(CST6)
V
DIV
(CST21)
(CST20)
V
Institutional ownership data collected includes manager name (mgmame), manager 
number (mgmo), report date (rdate), CUSIP, shares held at report date (shares), stock 
name (stkname), ticker symbol (ticker), shares outstanding in 1000s at the end o f quarter 
(shrout2), and share price at the end of quarter (prc). For each hospitality firm, the 
institutional ownership percentage at the end o f each year from 1999-2003 (if available)
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was calculated by dividing the number o f shares held by institutional investors by the 
number o f shares outstanding at the end of the fourth quarter.
Summary
A proposed simultaneous equations model investigating the institutional 
ownership/firm performance relationship in the hospitality industry was presented with 
justifications on variable selection and on possible statistical technique adoption in this 
chapter. After data colleetion on the identified sample firms, the statistical techniques that 
were discussed in this chapter can be deployed and results will be presented in the next 
chapter.
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CHAPTER 4
FINDINGS OF THE STUDY 
The first section o f this chapter provides the descriptive statistics o f all variables used 
in this dissertation; further, a pair-wise correlation matrix is presented. The second 
section presents relevant data analysis results, including the DWH test and regression 
analyses for the three hospitality sectors as described in Chapter Three. The three 
hypotheses o f this dissertation will then be tested and the underlying assumptions of 
relevant regression analysis will be checked in the last section.
Descriptive Statistics 
The Restaurant Sector 
Ninety-nine restaurant firms were first identified hy their individual NAICS code 
number (i.e., 722110 & 722211). Firms with insufficient accounting and financial data 
needed for this study and/or lacking institutional ownership information between 
1999-2003 were excluded. Five years (1999-2003) o f data were pooled for a total of 284 
firm/year observations from 65 restaurant firms, including 50 full-service restaurant firms 
(NAICS code 722110) and 15 limited-service ones (NAICS code 722211). Sample 
descriptive statistics o f the variables are presented in Table 5.
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Table 5 Descriptive Statistics for the Restaurant Sector
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Max Min
Ô 284 1.517 0.767 4.531 0.470
INST 284 0.412 0318 1.255 0.000
SIZE 284 8.249 0.741 10.407 6372
DEBT 284 0.275 0309 1.000 0.000
FIX 284 0.108 0.251 4.167 0.005
ROA 284 0.032 0.094 0.227 -0.573
BETA 284 0366 0389 1.546 -0.785
DIV 284 0.036 0.110 0.907 0.000
Proxy Q ranges from 0.470 to 4.531, with a mean o f 1.517. Two hundred and ten out 
o f the 284 firm/year observations, or 73.9% of the pooled restaurant sample, had a proxy 
Q of larger than one (see Figure 2). From an individual firm perspective, 53 out o f the 65 
restaurant firms, or 81.5%, had an average proxy Q o f larger than one (see Figure 3). 
When a firm is worth more than its value based on what it would cost to rebuild it, or 
when Tobin’s Q is larger than one, excess profits are being earned, and these profits are 
above and beyond the level that is necessary to keep the firm in the industry (Lindenberg 
& Ross, 1981). In other words, the majority o f the restaurant firms in the sample have 
performed relatively well as measured by their larger than one proxy g s  during 
1999-2003.
71
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
^  ■'à' "ir % 'ir "%
Proxy Q
Figure 2. Histogram o f Proxy g  for the Restaurant Sector (Firm/Year)
The average percentage o f institutional ownership (INST) is 41.2%, with a maximum 
of 125.5% and a minimum o f 0.006%. In the case o f short sales by institutional investors 
where some o f the firm shares are owned by more than one party, it is possible that 
institutional ownership exceeds 100% of the firm (Asquith, Pathak & Ritter, 2005). One 
hundred and sixty-two out o f the 284 firm/observations, or 57.0% of the pooled 
restaurant sample, had less than 50% institutional ownership during 1999-2003 (see 
Figure 4). From an individual firm perspective, 39 out of the 65 restaurant firms had an 
average o f less than 50% institutional ownership during 1999-2003 (see Figure 5).
Another notable characteristic is the 27.5% mean deht ratio. This implies that the 
restaurant firms rely less on debt financing and more on equity capital. Two hundred and 
fifty out o f the 284 restaurant firm/year observations had a debt ratio o f less than 50% 
(see Figure 6). From an individual firm perspective, fifty-eight, or almost 90%, o f the 65 
restaurant firms had an average debt ratio o f less than 50% (see Figure 7).
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Figure 3. Histogram of Proxy Q for the Restaurant Sector (Firm Average)
Institutional Ownership (1.00 = 100%)
Figure 4. Histogram of Institutional Ownership for the Restaurant Sector (Firm/Year)
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Institutional Ownership (1.00 = 100%)
Figure 5. Histogram o f Institutional Ownership for the Restaurant Sector (Firm Average)
Debt Ratio
Figure 6. Histogram o f Debt Ratio for the Restaurant Sector (Firm/Year)
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Debt Ratio
Figure 7. Histogram of Debt Ratio for the Restaurant Sector (Firm Average)
The Casino Sector
Fifty-three casino firms were initially identified hy their individual NAICS code 
number (i.e., 721120 & 713210). Firms with insufficient accounting and financial data 
and/or lacking institutional ownership information between 1999-2003 were eliminated. 
Five years (1999-2003) o f data were pooled for a total o f 106 firm/year observations from 
24 casino firms, including 18 casino hotel firms (NAICS code 721120) and six casino 
firms (NAICS code 713210). Sample descriptive statistics for the variables are presented 
in Table 6.
Proxy Q ranges from 0.414 to 3.086, with a mean o f 1.139. Sixty-nine out o f the 106
firm/year observations, or 65.1% of the pooled casino sample, had a proxy Q o f larger
than one (see Figure 8). From an individual firm perspective, 17 out o f the 24 casino
firms, or 70.8% o f the firms, had an average proxy Q o f larger than one (see Figure 9). As
with the restaurant sector, the majority o f the casino firms in the sample seem to have
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performed relatively well as measured by their larger than one proxy Qs during 
1999-2003.
Table 6 Descriptive Statistics for the Casino Sector
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Max Min
Ô 106 1.139 0.435 3.086 0.414
INST 106 0.466 0378 0.872 OTWl
SIZE 106 &996 0.741 10.111 7.391
DEBT 106 0326 0.221 1.000 0.000
FIX 106 4.516 39.914 407.65 0.004
ROA 106 0.019 0.044 0.157 -0.105
BETA 106 0399 0.545 1.930 -0.678
DIV 106 0.041 0307 E638 0.000
The average percentage of institutional ownership (INST) is 46.6%, with a maximum 
of 87.2% and a minimum of 0.1%. Fifty-seven out o f the 106 firm/year observations, or 
53.8% of the pooled casino sample, had less than 50% institutional ownership during 
1999-2003 (see Figure 10). From an individual firm perspective, 13 out o f  the 24 casino 
firms had an average o f less than 50% institutional ownership during 1999-2003 (see 
Figure 11).
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Proxy Q
Figure 8. Flistogram of Proxy Q for the Casino Sector (Firm/Year)
Another noteworthy characteristic is the 52.6% mean deht ratio in the casino sample. 
It shows that the casino firms in this study, on average, rely slightly more on debt 
financing than on equity capital. Sixty-two out o f the 106 casino firm/year observations 
had a debt ratio o f more than 50% (see Figure 12). Alternatively from an individual firm 
perspective, 13, or 54.2%, of the casino firms had an average deht ratio o f more than 50% 
(see Figure 13).
The mean for FIX is 451.6%. This was due to the inclusion of the Wynn Resorts 
(NASDAQ: WYNN) which opened in late April 2005. The Wynn Resorts provided two 
firm/year observations (2002 & 2003) and its inclusion did not affect the results o f this 
dissertation significantly during preliminary data analysis; therefore, their data were not 
excluded from the study. The mean FIX reduces to 13.6% with a standard deviation of 
20.7% if  the Wynn data were excluded.
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Figure 9. Histogram o f Proxy Q for the Casino Sector (Firm Average)
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Institutional Ownership (1.00 = 100%)
Figure 10. Histogram of Institutional Ownership for the Casino Sector (Firm/Year)
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Figure 11. Histogram o f Institutional Ownership for the Casino Sector (Firm Average)
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Debt Ratio
Figure 12. Histogram of Debt Ratio for the Casino Sector (Firm/Year)
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Figure 13. Histogram of Debt Ratio for the Casino Sector (Firm Average)
The Hotel Sector
Tiventy-eight hotel firms were originally targeted by their individual NAICS code 
(721110). Firms with insufficient accounting and financial data and/or lacking 
institutional ownership information between 1999-2003 were excluded. Five years 
(1999-2003) o f data were pooled for a total o f 75 firm/year observations from 19 hotel 
firms. Sample descriptive statistics for the variables are presented in Table 7.
Proxy Q ranges from 0.625 to 3.659, with a mean of 1.121. Forty-one out o f the 75 
firm/year observations, or 54.7% of the pooled hotel sample, had a proxy Q o f larger than 
one (see Figure 14). From an individual firm perspective, only nine out o f the 19 casino 
firms, or 47.4% of the firms, had an average proxy Q o f larger than one (see Figure 15). 
Different from the restaurant and casino sectors, only about half o f the hotel firms in the 
sample performed well during the time frame o f this study as measured by their larger 
than one proxy Qs during 1999-2003.
80
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The average percentage o f institutional ownership (INST) is 43.9%, with a maximum 
of 94.1% and a minimum of 5.8%. Forty-eight out o f the 75 firm/year observations, or 
64% of the pooled hotel sample, had less than 50% institutional ownership during 
1999-2003 (see Figure 16). From an individual firm perspective, 12 out o f the 19 hotel 
firms had an average o f less than 50% institutional ownership during 1999-2003 (see 
Figure 17).
Table 7 Descriptive Statistics for the Hotel Sector
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Max Min
Q 75 1.121 0.568 3.659 0.625
INST 75 0.439 0.215 0.941 0.058
SIZE 75 9.013 0.542 10.073 7.992
DEBT 75 0.419 0.211 0.950 0.102
FIX 75 0.185 0356 1.872 0.000
ROA 75 0.012 (1081 0.491 -0.199
BETA 75 0.713 0.504 2369 -0T88
DIV 75 0376 1.269 10.310 0.000
The 41.9% mean debt ratio in the hotel sample shows that the hotel firms in this study, 
on average, rely less on debt financing than on equity capital. Twenty out o f the 75 hotel 
firm/year observations had a debt ratio o f less than 50% (see Figure 18). Alternatively, 14, 
or 73.7%, of the hotel firms had an average debt ratio of less than 50% (see Figure 19).
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Figure 14. Histogram of Proxy Q for the Hotel Sector (Firm/Year)
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Proxy Q
Figure 15. Histogram of Proxy Q for the Hotel Sector (Firm Average)
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Institutional Ownership (1.00 = 100%)
Figure 16. Histogram of Institutional Ownership for the Hotel Sector (Firm/Year)
0.00 .13 .25 .38 .50
Institu tion^ Ownership (1.00 = 100%)
Figure 17. Histogram of Institutional Ownership for the Hotel Sector (Firm Average)
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Figure 18. Histogram of Debt Ratio for the Hotel Sector (Firm/Year)
Debt Ratio
Figure 19. Histogram o f Debt Ratio for the Hotel Sector (Firm Average)
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Correlation Matrix
Table 8 shows the correlation matrix o f the variables used in the restaurant sector.
The 0.602 correlation coefficient between INST and proxy Q  suggests a possible 
relationship between the two from either direction. The 0.661 correlation coefficient 
between INST and SIZE implies that firm size may be an important factor in determining 
institutional ownership. The remaining correlation coefficients indicate moderate to low 
inter-correlation among the other variables.
Table 9 shows the correlation matrix o f the variables used in the casino sector. The 
low 0.101 correlation coefficient between INST and proxy Q does not show a likely 
relationship between the two. Again, the 0.606 correlation coefficient between INST and 
SIZE indicates that firm size may play an important role in determining institutional 
ownership. The remaining correlation coefficients, except those between SIZE and BETA, 
indicate moderate to low inter-correlation among the other variables.
Table 8 Correlation Matrix of the Variables Used in the Restaurant Sector
INST Proxy Q SIZE DEBT FIX ROA DIV BETA
INST 1
Proxy Q 0.602** 1
SIZE 0.661** 0.333** 1
DEBT -0.305** -0.254** 0.087 1
FIX 0.036 0.271** -0.099 -0.094 1
ROA 0.442** 0.337** 0.312** -0.160** -0.084 1
DIV 0.067 -0.081 0.302** -0.115 -0.046 0.099 1
BETA 0.373** 0.303** 0.495** -0.025 0.087 0.168** 0.112 1
Note: ** represents the 0.01 significance level.
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Table 9 Correlation Matrix o f the Variables Used in the Casino Sector
INST Proxy Q SIZE DEBT FIX ROA DIV BETA
INST 1
Proxy Q 0.101 1
SIZE 0.606** 0.062 1
DEBT -0.053 0.348** 0.222* 1
FIX -0.022 0.134 0.035 -0.086 1
ROA 0.110 0.339** -0.117 -0.318** -0.118 1
DIV 0.272** 0.023 0.300** -0.072 -0.024 0.009 1
BETA 0.451** 0.100 0.609** 0.201* 0.093 -0.055 0.280** 1
Note: ** and * represent the 0.01 and 0.05 significance levels, respectively.
Table 10 Correlation Matrix of the Variables Used in the Hotel Sector
INST Proxy Q SIZE DEBT FIX ROA DIV BETA
INST 1
Proxy Q 0.253* 1
SIZE 0.340** 0.146 I
DEBT -0.332** -0.309** -0.213 1
FIX -0.266* -0.216 -0.069 -0.026 1
ROA 0.203 0.321** 0.066 -0.252* -0.024 1
DIV -0.207 -0.012 0.233* -0.172 0.073 0.036 1
BETA 0.377** 0.263* 0.572** 0.251* -0.099 0.081 -0.072 1
Note: ** and * represent the 0.01 and 0.05 significance levels, respectively.
Table 10 shows the correlation matrix o f the variables used in the hotel sector. The 
low 0.253 correlation coefficient between Proxy Q and INST does not indicate a strong
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relationship between the two from either direction. The remaining correlation coefficients 
indicate moderate to low inter-correlation among the other variables.
Results o f the Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test 
As aforementioned, in a system containing interdependent endogenous variables, the 
2SLS technique is preferred over OLS as the latter may result in biased and inconsistent 
parameter estimates (Wooldridge, 2003). The DWH test on INST in the firm performance 
equation [i.e., Eq. (1)] and on proxy Q in the institutional ownership equation [i.e., Eq. 
(2)], respectively, was performed in the restaurant, casino and hotel sectors to justify the 
need and the adoption o f 2SLS in either Eq. (1) or Eq. (2), or both.
As shown in Table 11, the DWH test results show that the coefficient o f INST res in 
the restaurant sector is significantly different from zero (t = -3.644,p  = 0.000) at the 0.01 
significance level. The results not only echo previous research treating ownership 
structure (e.g., managerial ownership, institutional ownership and hlockholder ownership) 
as an endogenous variable when modeling its relationship with firm performance 
(Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Cho, 1998; Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Demsetz & Villalonga, 
2001; Holdemess et al., 1999; Loderer & Martin, 1997; McConnell & Servaes, 1990) but 
also justify the need for 2SLS in Eq. (1) and inclusion o f the endogenous institutional 
ownership variable in a simultaneous equations system in the restaurant sector. On the 
other hand, the DWH test results in Table 12 show that the coefficient o f g  res is not 
significantly different from zero (t = 0.007,/? = 0.995). This suggests that applying OLS 
in Eq. (2) for the restaurant sector is sufficient to produce consistent and unbiased 
regression coefficients.
87
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table 11 Results of the DWH Test for Endogeneity o f ESfST for the Restaurant Sector
Dependent Variable Q t statistics p  value
Independent Variable
(Intercept) 4.409 0.000
INST 6.958 0.000
SIZE -3.448 0.001
DEBT 0.035
FIX 4.346 0.000
INST res -3.644 0.000
Table 12 Results o f the DWH Test for Endogeneity o f Proxy Q for the Restaurant Sector
Dependent Variable INST t statistics p  value
Independent Variable
(Intercept) -12.166 0.000
Ô 2323 0.021
SIZE 10.951 0.000
ROA 3.025 0.003
BETA -0.613 0.541
DEBT -5.910 0.000
DIV -2967 0.003
g r e s 0.007 0.995
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As shown in Table 13, the DWH test results show that the coefficient of INST res in 
the casino sector is significantly different from zero (t -  -4.681,/? = 0.000) at the 0.01 
significance level. Again the endogeneity o f institutional ownership is evidenced and the 
application o f 2SLS in Eq. (1) is justified in the casino sector. The DWH test results in 
Table 14 show that the coefficient o f g  res is not significantly different from zero (t = 
0.690, p  = 0.492). This indicates that applying OLS in Eq. (2) for the casino sector is 
sufficient to produce consistent and unbiased regression coefficients.
Table 13 Results o f the DWH Test for Endogeneity o f INST for the Casino Sector
Dependent Variable Q t statistics p  value
Independent Variable
(Intercept) 5.425 0.000
INST 5.057 0.000
SIZE -4.960 0.000
DEBT &673 0.000
FIX 3.6II 0.000
INST_res -4.681 0.000
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Table 14 Results of the DWH Test for Endogeneity o f Proxy Q for the Casino Sector
Dependent Variable INST t statistics /? value
Independent Variable
(Intercept) -4.053 0.000
Ô -0.342 0.733
SIZE 5.682 0.000
ROA 1.074 fr286
BETA 1.431 0.156
DEBT -0.601 0.549
DIV 0.721 0.473
Q r e s (1690 0.492
As shown in Table 15, the DWH test results show that the coefficient of INST res in 
the hotel sector is not significantly different from zero (t = -1.393,/? = 0.168). Different 
from the evidence o f the endogeneity of institutional ownership shown in the restaurant 
and casino sectors, institutional ownership in the hotel sector is deemed exogenous and is 
not determined inside o f the proposed simultaneous equations system. Therefore, the 
application o f 2SLS in Eq. (I) is not justified, and applying OLS in Eq. (I) is sufficient. 
The DWH test results in Table 16 show that the coefficient o f g  res is significantly 
different from zero (t = -2.146,/? = 0.036) at the 0.05 significance level. This suggests 
that proxy Q acts as an endogenous explanatory variable in Eq. (2) and applying 2SLS in 
Eq. (2) for the hotel sector is justified.
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Table 15 Results of the DWH Test for Endogeneity o f INST for the Hotel Sector
Dependent Variable Q t statistics p  value
Independent Variable
(Intercept) I.2I3 0.229
INST L583 0.II8
SIZE -0.478 0.634
DEBT -1.087 I128I
FIX -0.651 0.518
INST res -E393 0.168
Table 16 Results o f the DWH Test for Endogeneity o f Proxy Q for the Hotel Sector
Dependent Variable INST t statistics p  value
Independent Variable
(Intercept) -2.098 0.040
Ô 2236 0.029
SIZE 2.409 0.019
ROA -I.0I8 0.312
BETA -0.659 0.512
DEBT 41258 0.797
DIV -2.551 0.013
g r e s -2.146 0.036
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In summary, in both the restaurant and casino sectors, applying the 2SLS technique in 
Eq. (1) is justified and the endogeneity o f institutional ownership is evidenced, while 
OLS application is sufficient in Eq. (2) where proxy Q acts as an exogenous explanatory 
variable. In the hotel sector, opposite to the two other sectors and to some previous 
empirical studies, institutional ownership is found to be exogenous, and, therefore, OLS 
application is sufficient in Eq. (1). While proxy Q is found to be an endogenous 
explanatory variable in Eq. (2), 2SLS is preferred over OLS.
Regression Results
The OLS and 2SLS functions in SPSS software were applied in estimating Eqs. (1) 
and (2) in the simultaneous equations model. Although only one o f the two techniques is 
suitable for testing the firm performance equation [i.e., Eqs. (1)] or the institutional 
ownership equation [i.e., Eq. (2)] in this study depending upon the DWH tests performed 
in the previous section, both the OLS and 2SLS regression results o f Eqs. (1) and (2) for 
the restaurant, casino and hotel sectors are presented and interpreted in this section.
Firm Performance Equation: The Restaurant Sector 
Both the OLS and 2SLS results for Eq. (1) are presented in Table 17. For the OLS 
results, most remarkably, restaurant firm performance as measured by proxy Q is 
statistically dependent on the percentage o f institutional ownership (t = 9.246, p  = 0.000) 
at the 0.01 significance level. This finding is consistent with previous research where 
institutional ownership was treated as an exogenous variable (Chaganti & Damanpour, 
1991; Han & Suck, 1998; McConnell & Servaes, 1990). In other words, a higher 
percentage o f institutional ownership contributes to better restaurant firm performance.
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Table 17 Regression Results o f the Performanee Equation for the Restaurant Sector
Dependent Variable: Firm Performance (Proxy Q)
OLS 2SLS
t statistics /? value VIF t statistics /? value
(Intercept) 3.578 0.000 3.887 0.000
INST 9.246 0.000 2.309 6.134 0.000
SIZE -1.880 0.061 2.108 -3.040 0.003
DEBT 0.391 0.696 1.288 L872 ' 0LI62
FIX 4.884 0.000 1.029 3.832 0.000
F  statistics 45.506 0.000 36200 0.000
Adjusted 0.385 0.332
Treating institutional ownership endogenously as justified by the DWH test, the 2SLS 
results indicate that institutional ownership (INST) is still a significant determinant o f 
restaurant firm performance (t = 6.134,/? = 0.000) at the 0.01 significance level. While 
this finding is inconsistent with certain previous research that failed to establish a positive 
and significant relationship between institutional ownership and firm performanee in a 
simultaneous framework (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Craswell et al., 1997; Loderer & 
Martin, 1997), it confirms Clay’s (2001) empirical conclusion that institutional ownership 
inereases firm value, as measured by a proxy for Tobin’s Q. It is possible that when 
finaneial institutions acquire a block o f financial interest in restaurant firms, they assume
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an efficient monitoring role in the firms in order to fulfill their fiduciary duty; hence, this 
may result in better restaurant firm performance.
SIZE was included as a control variable and was found to be a significant determinant 
o f restaurant firm performance for both the OLS (t = -1.880,/? = 0.061) result at the 0.1 
significance level and the 2SLS (t = -3.040,/? = 0.003) result at the 0.05 significance level. 
The negative sign suggests that larger restaurant firms tend to be associated with lower 
proxy Q. This finding is consistent with what was expected— that both growth 
opportunities and Tobin’s Q should be lower for larger firms (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996). 
This was also evidenced in the restaurant sector in this study.
DEBT was found to be a significant and positive determinant o f restaurant firm 
performance in 2SLS (t = 1.872,/? = 0.062) at the 0.1 significance level but not in OLS. 
Although restaurant firms are considered less debt dependent with an average debt ratio 
o f 27.5% as shown in Table 5, DEBT serves to capture a value-enhaneing effect possibly 
through corporate tax shields that result in higher values of performanee indicators— in 
this study proxy Q (Morck et al., 1988). Furthermore, while proxy Q reflects how the 
market prices the firm to some extent (the numerator o f proxy Q calculation contains the 
market value o f common equity o f the firm), the positive impact o f DEBT on proxy Q in 
the restaurant sector indicates that the market may encourage restaurant firms to utilize 
more of their debt capacity or increase their debt leverage.
FIX exhibits a positive impact on restaurant firm performance in both the OLS (t = 
4.884,/? = 0.000) and 2SLS results (t = 3.832,/? = 0.000) at the 0.01 significance level. A 
possible aecounting distortion (e.g., different depreciation methods) o f restaurant firm 
performance measured by proxy Q may have existed in restaurant firms over the period
94
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
involved in this study. Although the average FIX o f 10.8% in the sample firms is 
relatively low compared to that o f 49.6% in Demsetz & Villalonga’s (2001) study, the 
results echo their findings that FIX has a significant and positive impact on average 
Tobin’s Q.
The adjusted R-squared for Eq. (1) is 0.385 for OLS and 0.332 for 2SLS. In other 
words, the OLS model explains 38.5% o f the variations o f proxy Q where institutional 
ownership was treated as an exogenous variable, and the 2SLS model accounted for 
33.2% o f the variations o f proxy Q where institutional ownership was treated 
endogenously. This study’s adjusted R-squared figures derived from the model in the 
restaurant seetor are higher than those o f previous studies. For example, Agrawal & 
Knoeber (1996) had a 0.35 adjusted R-squared for the OLS model and 0.05 for the 2SLS 
one, and Clay (2001) had a 0.33 adjusted R-square for the OLS model and 0.15 for the 
2SLS one. The F  statistics for Eq. (1) are 45.506 (p = 0.000) for OLS and 36.200 (p = 
0.000) for 2SLS, indicating that both the models are statistically significant at the 0.01 
significanee level in explaining the variations in restaurant firm performance as measured 
by proxy Q.
Serious multicollinearity is likely not present in OLS, sinee all VIFs o f the 
independent variables are below 10 (Neter et al., 1996). For the 2SLS technique, the level 
o f multicollinearity among the independent variables could not be assessed because VIFs, 
Pearson correlation matrix or condition index is not available in the 2SLS regression 
output. Although the coeffieient estimates in the presence of multieollinearity remain 
unbiased and the R-squared is unaffected, the issue of multicollinearity may cause large 
varianees o f the coefficient estimates that attribute Type II errors. One rule of thumb in
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dealing with the multicollinearity issue is that, as long as all t statistics are larger than 2 
when adopting the 0.05 signifieance level or larger than 1.67 when adopting the 0.1 
significance level, the issue is not o f concern (Kennedy, 2003). In other words, when key 
t statistics are large enough to reject the null hypothesis in a t-test at the 0.1 significance 
level adopted in this study, the effect o f multicollinearity on the model becomes 
irrelevant (Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, personal communication, April 5, 2005). In view of 
the t statistics o f the 2SLS results in Table 17, possible existence o f serious 
multicollinearity effects in this study appear to be minimal.
While the 2SLS technique is justified and preferred in Eq. (1) in the restaurant sector, 
the OLS and 2SLS techniques yield relatively similar results on the t tests o f the set of 
independent variables with the exeeption of the DEBT variable.
Institutional Ownership Equation: The Restaurant Sector
Table 18 presents regression results o f the institutional ownership equation for the 
restaurant sector. Proxy Q was found to be a significant determinant o f the percentage of 
institutional ownership in restaurant firms for both the OLS (t = 7.129,/? = 0.000) and 
2SLS (t = 2.327,/? = 0.021) results at the 0.05 signifieance level. In other words, 
institutional investors are attracted to restaurant firms with better performance, as 
measured by proxy Q. Better performing restaurant firms may help satisfy institutional 
investors’ fiduciary duties to their clients and attract higher institutional shareholdings. 
This finding is consistent with Cho’s (1998), Loderer & Martin’s (1997) and Demsetz & 
Villalonga’s (2001) studies, in whieh ownership structure is treated endogenously.
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Table 18
Regression Results o f the Institutional Ownership Equation for the Restaurant Sector
Dependent Variable: Institutional Ownership Percentage
OLS 2SLS
t statistics /? value VIF t statistics /? value
(Intercept) -12.635 0.000 -12.188 0.000
Q 7.129 0.000 1.423 2.327 0.021
SIZE 13.831 0.000 1.731 10.971 0.000
ROA 3.577 0.000 1.212 3.303 0.003
BETA -0.670 0.504 1.367 -0.614 0.540
DEBT -7.790 0.000 1.185 -5.920 0.000
DIV <3.695 0.000 1.209 -2.973 0.003
F  statistics 104.949 0.000 92380 0.000
Adjusted (X688 0.671
SIZE was found to affect the level o f institutional ownership in restaurant firms in a 
positive and significant manner for both the OLS (t = 13.381,/? = 0.000) and 2SLS (t = 
10.971,/? = 0.000) results at the 0.01 significance level. Although larger firms require 
more investment capital from shareholders for a given fraction o f equity o f the firm, 
institutions seem to have a preference for larger restaurant firms, which may be due to 
their higher financial capability than smaller firms. This finding is consistent with what
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was expected—  that financial institutions are more likely to buy stocks o f large firms 
(Crutchley et ah, 1999). This was also evidenced in the restaurant sector in this study.
Consistent with O ’Brien and Bhushan’s (1990), and Crutchley et al.’s (1999) studies, 
the profitability o f restaurant firms in this study (measured by ROA) was found to be a 
significant and positive determinant o f institutional ownership percentage for both the 
OLS (t = 3.577,/? = 0.000) and 2SLS (t = 3.303,/? = 0.003) results at the 0.01 
significance level. This result also supports the notion that financial institutions invest in 
firms with higher profitability to fulfill their fiduciary responsibility to investors 
(Crutchley et ah, 1999).
In a finding that is inconsistent with the research o f O ’Brien and Bhushan (1990) and 
Crutchley et al. (1999), BETA, or the systematic risk o f the restaurant firms in this study, 
does not have a significant relationship with the changes in institutional ownership 
percentage for either the OLS or 2SLS results. One possible explanation for the lack of 
significance for the BETA variable in this study is that the stocks of restaurant firms may 
not be risky, as evidenced by the average BETA o f 0.366 (see Table 5) for the sample 
firms, where only 20 out o f the 284 restaurant firm/year observations had a BETA greater 
than one. Typical stocks have a BETA equal to or greater than one (Keown et al., 2003). 
The average value o f BETA in Crutchley et al.’s (1999) study was 1.064 for the 1987 
sample and 1.072 for the 1993 sample. BETA in their study acts as a significant 
determinant o f institutional ownership percentage for both years that were examined. In 
other words, finaneial institutions may not consider risk in terms of BETA as a 
significant factor when making buy/sell decisions on restaurant stocks, since the overall 
industry has a low systematic risk level.
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DEBT has a significant and negative impact on institutional ownership in restaurant 
firms for both the OLS (t = -7.790,/? = 0.000 and 2SLS (t = -5.920,/? = 0.000) results at 
the 0.01 significance level. Thus, higher debt ratios lead to lower institutional ownership 
percentages. This finding is consistent with the notion that higher debt ratios lessen the 
need for institutional monitoring and result in lower shareholdings by institutions 
(Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001; Welch, 2003). This result also supports Bathala et al.’s 
(1994), Chaganti & Damanpour’s (1991) and Crutchley & Jensen’s (1996) empirical 
findings that debt and institutional ownership have become substitutes for each other in 
the agency framework. In other words, restaurants with lower debt levels may allow 
institutions to have greater freedom in their monitoring role, thus creating an incentive for 
them to own more shares. In addition, institutions may prefer low-debt firms possibly due 
to their fear o f high bankruptcy rates in restaurant firms (Gu, 2002).
DIV shows a significant and negative impact on institutional ownership in restaurant 
firms for both the OLS (t = -3.695,/? = 0.000) and 2SLS (t = -2.973,/? = 0.003) results at 
the 0.01 significance level. The negative sign on DIV further suggests that institutions 
may prefer restaurant firms that retain their earnings for future reinvestment purposes. 
This finding supports what Jensen, Solberg & Zom ’s (1992) point that financial 
institutions investing in firms are not attracted by any specific dividend policy.
The adjusted R-squared of Eq. (2) is 0.688 for OLS and 0.671 for 2SLS. Thus, the 
OLS model explained 68.8% of the variations in the institutional ownership data where it 
was treated exogenously, and the 2SLS model accounted for 67.1% of the variations in 
the institutional ownership data where it was treated endogenously. As with Eq. (1), the 
adjusted R-squared figures o f Eq. (2) derived from this study are much higher than those
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of previous studies. Agrawal & Knoeber (1996) had a 0.13 adjusted R-squared for the 
2SLS model (no OLS model was examined on the institutional ownership in their study), 
and Clay (2001) had a 0.49 adjusted R-squared for the OLS model (no 2SLS model was 
examined on the institutional ownership in his study). In this study, the model F  statistics 
for Eq. (2) are 104.949 {p = 0.000) for OLS and 97.380 {p = 0.000) for 2SLS, signifying 
that both models are statistically significant in explaining the variations in institutional 
ownership as measured by their ownership percentage at the 0.01 significance level.
Serious multicollinearity does not appear to be present in the OLS model, since all 
VIFs are below 10 (Neter et al., 1996). Concerns o f serious multicollinearity among the 
independent variables in 2SLS do not seem to be present either, since OLS application is 
sufficient in Eq. (2). While OLS is sufficient in Eq. (2) for the restaurant sector, both the 
OLS and 2SLS techniques provide identical results on the t-tests for the set of 
independent variables (e.g., SIZE is significant in both the OLS and 2SLS results).
Firm Performance Equation: The Casino Sector
Table 19 shows both the OLS and 2SLS results o f Eq. (1) for the casino sector. For 
the OLS results, institutional ownership demonstrates a significant and positive impact (t 
= 1.970,/? = 0.051), at the 0.1 significance level, on casino firm performance as measured 
by proxy Q. This finding is not only consistent with previous research where institutional 
ownership was treated as an exogenous variable (Chaganti & Damanpour, 1991; Han & 
Suck, 1998; McConnell & Servaes, 1990), but also with what was found in the restaurant 
sector in this study. Thus, a higher percentage o f institutional ownership leads to better 
casino firm performance.
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Table 19 Regression Results of the Performance Equation for the Casino Sector
Dependent Variable: Firm Performance (Proxy Q)
OLS 2SLS
t statistics p  value VIF t statistics p  value
(Intercept) 2.784 0.006 2.344 0.021
INST 1.970 0.051 1.804 2.185 0.031
SIZE -1.572 0.119 1.955 -2.143 0.035
DEBT 4.282 0.000 1.150 2h883 0.005
FIX 1.994 0.049 1.016 1.560 0.122
F  statistics 5.566 0.000 2.227 0.071
Adjusted 0.144 0.045
Considering institutional ownership as an endogenous explanatory variable, as 
justified by the DWH test, the 2SLS results show that institutional ownership is still a 
significant determinant o f casino firm performance (t = 2.185,/? = 0.031) at the 0.05 
significance level. This finding is, again, inconsistent with previous research that failed to 
establish a positive and significant relationship between institutional ownership and firm 
performance in a simultaneous Ifamework (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Craswell et ah, 
1997; Loderer & Martin, 1997). However, it confirms Clay’s (2001) empirical conclusion 
that institutional ownership increases firm value as measured by a proxy for Tobin’s Q, 
as was found for the restaurant sector in this study. Institutional investors may have
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assumed an efficient monitoring role in eorporate governance in casino firms, despite the 
possible hindrance o f ownership restrietions set forth in state gaming regulations, in order 
to fulfill their fiduciary duties. This contributes to better casino firm performance.
SIZE, acting as a control variable, was found to be a significant determinant of casino 
firm performance for the 2SLS results (t = -2.143,/? = 0.035) at the 0.05 significanee 
level but not for the OLS ones. The negative sign indicates that larger casino firms are 
associated with lower proxy Qs. The expectation that both growth opportunities and 
Tobin’s Q should be lower for larger firms (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996) was also 
evidenced in the casino sector in this study
DEBT was found to be a significant and positive determinant o f casino firm 
performance in both the 2SLS (t = 4.282,/? = 0.000) and OLS (t = 2.883,/? = 0.005) 
results at the 0.01 significance level. Although the casino sector, characterized by a 
52.6% mean debt ratio in the sample as shown in Table 6, on average relies slightly more 
on debt than equity eapital, DEBT attributes a value-enhancing effect possibly via 
corporate tax shields that bring about higher values o f performance indicators— in this 
study proxy Q (Morck et al., 1988). In addition, since proxy Q somewhat reflects how the 
market prices the firm, the positive impact o f DEBT on proxy Q  indicates the market may 
encourage more debt usage of casino firms for future development purposes possibly due 
to the seetor’s prospective outlook.
FIX reveals a positive impact on casino firm performance in the OLS results (t = 
1.994,/? = 0.049) at the 0.05 significance level; however, no significant impact was found 
in the 2SLS results. As aforementioned that the 2SLS technique in Eq. (1) is justified by 
the DWH test, and it yields unbiased and consistent parameter estimates better than OLS
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(Wooldridge, 2003); FIX was determined not to have a significant impact on casino firm 
performance. In other words, a possible accounting distortion (e.g., different depreciation 
methods) o f casino firm performance as measured by proxy Q was not evidenced 
statistically in the sample firms. Only 39.6% o f the 106 casino firm/year observations had 
more than 10% of capital expenditures as a fraction o f sales. The average FIX is 13.6% 
(excluding the Wynn Resort) for the sample firms (see Table 6), compared to 49.6% in 
Demsetz & Villalonga’s (2001) study where FIX showed a significantly positive impact 
on average Tobin’s Q. The relatively low capital spending of casino firms, compared to 
the manufacturing firms in Demsetz & Villalonga’s (2001) study, was likely the cause o f 
FIX’S non-significant relationship with casino firm performance.
The adjusted R-squared for Eq. (1) is 0.144 for OLS and 0.045 for 2SLS. That is, the 
OLS model explained 14.4% o f the variations in proxy Q data where institutional 
ownership was treated as an exogenous variable, and the 2SLS model accounted for only 
4.5% of the variations in proxy Q data where institutional ownership was treated 
endogenously. The adjusted R-squared derived from this sector are lower than those of 
previous studies (e.g., Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Clay, 2001). It is possible that some 
important and/or relevant explanatory variables are omitted from the model. Nevertheless, 
the F  statistics for Eq. (1) are 5.566 {p = 0.000) for OLS and 2.227 {p -  0.071) for 2SLS, 
indicating that both models are statistically significant, but at the different significance 
levels, in explaining the variations in casino firm performance as measured by proxy Q.
Serious multicollinearity does not seem to be present in the OLS model, since all 
VIFs are below 10 (Neter et ah, 1996). According to the rule o f thumb provided by 
Kennedy (2003) and Wooldridge (Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, personal communication, April
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5, 2005) and in view o f the t statistics of the 2SLS results in Table 19, any possible effect 
from multicollinearity among the independent variables in 2SLS seems to be minimal.
While the DWH test suggests adoption o f the 2SLS technique in Eq. (1) in the casino 
sector, the OLS and 2SLS techniques provide different results on the t tests for the set of 
independent variables.
Institutional Ownership Equation: The Casino Sector 
As seen in Table 20, proxy Q was found to be a non-significant determinant o f the 
percentage o f institutional ownership in casino firms for both the OLS and 2SLS results. 
Contrary to what was expected, firm performance, as measured by proxy Q in this study, 
is not considered a significant factor while institutional investors make their buy/sell 
decisions on casino stocks. One possible explanation for this result is that casino firm 
performance is substantially affected by fluctuations o f gambling outcomes in the easinos 
from time to time, which prevents institutional investors from using this variable in 
making their buy/sell decisions. The factor o f “chance” or “luck” inherent in casino 
gaming is something that financial institutions may not be able to price accordingly. 
Another possible explanation is that firm performance measures, other than proxy Q, may 
be more suitable for the casino sector and may project a better picture o f casino firm 
performance. Mergers and aequisitions (M&A) activities of casino firms have been 
frequently observed in recent years and firm performance measures, such as operating 
margin, net profit margin, return on capital or return on net worth, are widely used in 
M&A activities (Bojanie & Officer, 1994; Malatesta & Walkling, 1988). It is possible 
that institutional investors have adopted these measures in gauging casino firm 
performance when making their buy/sell decisions.
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Table 20
Regression Results o f the Institutional Ownership Equation for the Casino Sector
Dependent Variable: Institutional Ownership Percentage
OLS 2SLS
t statistics p  value VIF t statistics p  value
(Intercept) -4.555 0.000 -3.973 0.000
Ô 1.024 0208 1.536 -0.336 0238
SIZE 5.759 0.000 1.684 5.570 0.000
ROA 0.917 0.361 1.501 1.052 0.295
BETA 1.390 0.168 1.639 1.402 0.164
DEBT <Z186 0.031 1.598 -0.589 0.557
DIV 0.600 0.550 1.152 0.707 0.481
F  statistics 13.125 0.000 12.396 0.000
Adjusted 0.409 0.394
SIZE has a significant and positive impact on institutional ownership in casino firms 
for both the OLS (t = 5.759,p  = 0.000) and 2SLS (t = 5.570,p  = 0.000) results at the 0.01 
significance level. Thus, larger casino firms attract more equity capital from institutional 
investors. This finding is consistent with what was expected, in that financial institutions 
are more likely to buy stocks o f large firms (Crutchley et ah, 1999).
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Inconsistent with the research o f O ’Brien and Bhushan’s (1990), and Crutchley et 
al.’s (1999), ROA was not found to be a significant determinant o f institutional 
ownership pereentage for either the OLS or 2SLS results. Similar to the rationale for the 
non-significance o f proxy Q and contrary to what was expected, ROA was not a 
significant factor for institutional investors in making their investment decisions in this 
study.
Inconsistent with what O ’Brien and Bhushan (1990), and Crutchley et al. (1999) 
found, BETA, or the systematic risk o f the casino firms in this study, does not 
demonstrate a significant impact on the ehanges in institutional ownership percentage for 
either the OLS or 2SLS results. One possible explanation for the lack o f significance of 
the BETA variable in the model is that the stocks o f casino firms are not considered as 
risky, as evidenced by the average BETA o f 0.599 (see Table 6) for the sample firms, 
where only 22 out o f the 106 casino firm/year observations had a BETA greater than one. 
Typical stocks have a BETA equal to or greater than one (Keown et al., 2003). In other 
words, the overall low BETA in the casino sector shows that financial institutions do not 
consider risk in terms of BETA measurement a significant factor when making their 
buy/sell decisions on casino stocks.
DEBT has a significant and negative impact on institutional ownership in casino 
firms in the OLS (t = -2.186,/? = 0.031) results at the 0.05 significance level, but not in 
the 2SLS results. Since OLS is sufficient in estimating Eq. (2), DEBT is determined to be 
a significant determinant of institutional ownership in casino firms in this study. Thus, 
higher debt ratios lead to lower institutional ownership percentages. This finding is 
consistent with the notion that higher debt ratios diminish the need for institutional
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monitoring and result in lower shareholdings by institutions (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001; 
Welch, 2003). This result also indieates that debt and institutional ownership may have 
beeome substitutes for eaeh other in the agency framework. In other words, low leverage 
in casino firms may give more room for institutions to play their monitoring role, thus 
creating an ineentive for them to hold more shares.
DIV does not play a significant role in affecting institutional ownership percentage in 
casino firms for either the OLS or 2SLS results at the 0.1 signifieanee level.
The adjusted R-squared o f Eq. (2) is 0.409 for OLS and 0.394 for 2SLS. Alternatively, 
40.9% of the variations o f institutional ownership were explained by the OLS model and 
39.4% of variations o f institutional ownership were accounted for by the 2SLS model.
The adjusted R-squared figures for Eq. (2) in this study are fairly eomparable to those of 
previous studies (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Clay, 2001). In this study, the model F  
statistics for Eq. (2) are 13.125 {p = 0.000) for OLS and 12.396 {p = 0.000) for 2SLS, 
which confirm that the models are statistically significant at the 0.01 significance level in 
explaining the variations in institutional ownership in casino firms.
While OLS is sufficient in Eq. (2) in the casino sector, VIFs are all below 10, and, 
therefore, no serious multicollinearity appears to be present (Neter et al., 1996). Both 
OLS and 2SLS provide identieal results on the t tests for the set o f independent variables 
except on the DEBT variables.
Firm Performance Equation: The Hotel Sector 
Table 21 shows both the OLS and 2SLS results o f Eq. (I) for the hotel sector.
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Table 21 Regression Results of the Performance Equation for the Hotel Sector
Dependent Variable: Firm Performance (Proxy Q)
OLS 2SLS
t statistics p  value VIF t statistics p  value
(Intercept) 0.007 0295 (F288 0.774
INST 0.955 0.343 I.3I5 1.466 0.147
SIZE 1.531 0.130 1.153 0.515 0 /# 8
DEBT -1.802 0.076 1.164 -0.684 0.496
FIX -1.588 0.117 1.082 -0.548 0286
F  statistics 3.875 0.007 3.712 0.009
Adjusted 0.136 0.131
Institutional ownership, whether treated exogenously or endogenously, does not 
significantly affect hotel firm performance, as measured by proxy Q at the O.I 
significance level in this study. From a theoretical and empirical standpoint, the finding is 
consistent with Demsetz’s (1983) argument on ownership endogeneity. It also supports 
other empirical research (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Craswell et al., 1997; Loderer & 
Martin, 1997) that ownership structure o f a firm is an endogenous outcome of 
competitive selection within the firm leading to firm value maximization. Therefore, no 
systematic relationship between firm performance and ownership structure should be 
expected. Thus, a higher percentage o f institutional ownership is not associated with
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better or worse hotel firm performance in this study. From a statistical standpoint, the 
endogeneity of the institutional ownership variable is not evidenced by the DWFI test; 
this result eonflicts with Demsetz’s (1983) argument on ownership endogeneity. One 
possible reason for this apparent contradiction may be due to the small hotel sample size 
(N=  75) in this study.
The non-significant relationship between institutional ownership and firm 
performance in the hotel sector also raises concerns from a statistical perspective. While 
the pair-wise Pearson correlation coefficient between the two (0.253) at the 0.05 
significance level (see Table 10) suggests some relationship between in a regression 
model, both part and partial correlation coefficients between INST and proxy Q reduced 
to below 0.1 with other control variables ineluded in the model; henee the 
non-significance o f INST on proxy Q (Hair, Anderson, Tatham & Black, 1998).
SIZE, a control variable, was found to be a non-insignificant determinant o f hotel 
firm performance for both the OLS and 2SLS results at the O.I significance level, 
possibly also due to the small sample size (N= 75) in this study.
DEBT was found to be a significant and negative determinant o f hotel firm 
performance in the OLS (t = -1 .802,p  = 0.076) results at the O.I significance level, but 
not in the 2SLS results. Sinee OLS is sufficient in Eq. (I) for the hotel sector, the OLS 
results were adopted. Although the hotel industry, characterized by a 41.9% mean debt 
ratio in the sample (see Table 7), relies less on debt than equity capital, DEBT has a 
value-reducing effect on proxy Q. This finding has some possible explanations. Firstly, as 
the pecking order theory suggests, well-performing firms in terms of their profitability 
are likely to be less-leveraged because they tend to finance their projects with internally
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generated earnings first (Morck et al., 1988; Myers & Majluf, 1984; Tong & Ning, 2004; 
Welch, 2003), the hotel industry usually cannot afford new development without some 
form o f public financing support, and the debt burden causes performance measure 
reductions (Hazinski, 2005). Secondly, the market seems to discourage hotel firms from 
utilizing more debt for future development possibly due to an unfavorable performance 
outlook on the hotel sector, especially given a recession and the effect of the 9.11 attacks 
(Higley, 2004).
FIX does not demonstrate any significant impact on firm performance for either the 
OLS or 2SLS results at the O.I significance level. A possible accounting distortion (e.g., 
different depreciation methods) of hotel firm performance, measured by proxy Q, was not 
evidenced statistically in the sample firms in this study. Only 44% of the 75 hotel 
firm/year observations had more than 10% of capital expenditures as a fraction o f sales. 
The average FIX is 18.50% for the sample firms (see Table 7), compared to 49.6% in 
Demsetz & Villalonga’s (2001) research where showed a significant and positive impact 
on average Tobin’s Q. The relatively low capital spending of the hotel sector, compared 
to the manufacturing firms in Demsetz & Villalonga’s (2001) study, was likely the cause 
o f f i x ’s non-significant impact on hotel firm performance.
The adjusted R-squared for Eq. (I) is 0.136 for OLS and 0.131 for 2SLS. In other 
words, the OLS model explained 13.6% o f the variations of proxy Q where institutional 
ownership was treated as an exogenous variable, and the 2SLS model accounted for 
13.1% of the variations o f proxy Q where institutional ownership was treated 
endogenously. The adjusted R-squared o f the models in this sector are less comparable 
than those of previous studies (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Clay, 2001); possibly some
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relevant explanatory variables are missing from the model. The F  statistics for Eq. (1) are 
3.875 ip = 0.007) for OLS and 3.712 {p = 0.009) for 2SLS, indicating that both models 
are statistically significant, at the 0.01 significance level, in explaining the variations in 
hotel firm performance as measured by proxy Q.
While the DWH test suggests OLS application in Eq. (1) in the hotel sector, all VIFs 
are below 10, indicating possible absence o f serious multicollinearity. The OLS and 
2SLS techniques yield similar results on the t tests o f the set of independent variables 
except for the DEBT variable.
Institutional Ownership Equation: The Hotel Sector
Table 22 presents regression results o f the institutional ownership equation for the 
hotel sector.
In particular, proxy Q  was not found to be a significant determinant o f the percentage 
o f institutional ownership in hotel firms for both the OLS and 2SLS results at the O.I 
significance level. One possible explanation for the lack of significance o f proxy Q might 
be that other variables omitted from the equation may be more important for institutional 
investors when making their buy/sell decisions than the hotel firm performance measure 
(proxy Q) used in this study. A second possibility may be the small sample size (V =  75). 
A third possibility may be that serious multicollinearity produced enlarged variances of 
the coefficient estimates, making it harder to reject the null hypothesis in a t-test for 
proxy Q in 2SLS (Kennedy, 2003). For the following interpretation on the non-significant 
variables, the multicollinearity issue should be noted.
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Table 22
Regression Results o f the Institutional Ownership Equation for the Hotel Sector
Dependent Variable: Institutional Ownership Percentage
OLS 2SLS
t statistics /? value VIF t statistics /? value
(Intercept) -1.125 0265 -1.095 0278
Ô 0.848 0.400 1.284 1.412 0.163
SIZE 2.088 0.041 1.688 0.884 0280
ROA 0.907 0268 1.111 -0.539 0.592
BETA 0.671 0.504 1.751 -0.664 0.509
DEBT -2.241 0T28 1.199 4)289 0.699
DIV -2.861 0.006 1.170 -1.724 0.090
F  statistics 5.243 0.000 2.522 0.030
Adjusted 0.261 0.113
SIZE has a significant and positive impaet on institutional ownership in hotel firms 
for the OLS (t = 2.088,/? = 0.041) results at the 0.05 significance level, but not for the 
2SLS results. Since 2SLS is deemed appropriate by the DWH test, SIZE is not 
determined to be signifieant in this study.
Inconsistent with the research o f O ’Brien and Bhushan’s (1990), and Crutchley et 
al.’s (1999), ROA was not found to be a significant determinant o f institutional
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ownership percentage in hotel firms for either the OLS or 2SLS results at the 0.1 
significance level. However, this significance test was conducted with a risk of 
committing a Type II error. Particularly, the opposite signs of ROA in the OLS and 2SLS 
results may be the result of the small sample size (N =  75) and the existence of serious 
multicollinearity. Further, the insignificance o f ROA in 2SLS may also result from 
serious multieollinearity that causes smaller t statistics. Similarly, BETA, or the 
systematic risk o f the hotel firms in this study, does not have a significant relationship 
with the changes in institutional ownership percentage for both the OLS and 2SLS results 
at the 0.1 significance level. This finding also has a possibility o f committing a Type II 
error. The opposite signs on the BETA variable in the OLS and 2SLS results could also 
be caused by the small sample size and serious multicollinearity, and the non-significance 
o f BETA in 2SLS may be caused by the enlarged variance resulting from serious 
multicollinearity. Therefore, no definite conclusions should be made on these two 
variables.
DEBT exhibits a significant and negative impact on institutional ownership in hotel 
firms in the OLS (t = - 2 . 2 4 1 , =  0.028) results at the 0.05 significance level, but not in 
the 2SLS results. Since 2SLS is appropriate in estimating Eq. (2), DEBT is determined 
“possibly” a non-significant determinant o f institutional ownership in hotel firms with a 
risk o f committing a Type II error.
DIV does play a significant role in institutional ownership percentage in hotel firms 
for both the OLS (t = -2.861, p  = 0.006) and 2SLS (t = -1.724,/> = 0.090) results, but at 
different significance levels. The negative sign suggests that institutions prefer hotel 
firms that retain earnings for future reinvestment purposes, rather than pay out dividends.
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Since hotels usually cannot afford future projects only with internally-generated funds 
and they raise funds through debt financing (Hazinski, 2005), it makes sense that 
institutional investors would prefer hotel firms retain earnings for reinvestment to lower 
the proportion of debt financing for future projects.
The adjusted R-squared for Eq. (2) are 0.261 for OLS and 0.113 for 2SLS. That is, 
26.1% of the variations of institutional ownership were explained by the OLS model and 
only 11.3% of the variations o f institutional ownership were accounted for by the 2SLS 
model. The adjusted R-squared for Eq. (2) in this study are less comparable to those of 
previous studies (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Clay, 2001), and some important variables 
may be missing from the model. In this study, the model F  values for Eq. (2) are 5.243 (p 
= 0.000) for OLS and 2.522 {p = 0.030) for 2SLS, signifying that both models are 
statistically significant, at the 0.05 significance level, in explaining the variations in 
institutional ownership in hotel firms.
While 2SLS is preferred in Eq. (2) in the hotel sector, the 2SLS results in Table 22 
raise some concern about committing Type II errors because o f possible serious 
multicollinearity among independent variables. The OLS and 2SLS techniques show 
relatively different results on the t tests o f the set o f independent variables and on the 
signs of the coefficients.
Hypotheses Testing
In review o f the preceding sections presenting the results of statistical analysis on the 
relationship between institutional ownership and firm performanee in three sectors o f the
114
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
hospitality industry, the three hypotheses constructed for this dissertation are tested in 
this section.
Hypothesis I posits that institutional ownership will have a positive impact on firm 
performance in the restaurant sector. This hypothesis is supported at least at the 0.01 
significance level. Employing the 2SLS technique, restaurant firm performance as 
measured by proxy Q is dependent on the percentage o f institutional ownership (t = 6.134, 
p  = 0.000) where institutional ownership is treated as an endogenous explanatory variable 
as suggested by the DWH test. Alternatively, treating institutional ownership as a pure 
exogenous explanatory variable, the OLS results still support Hypothesis I— that 
institutional ownership significantly influences restaurant firm performance in a positive 
way (t = 9.246,/? = 0.000).
Hypothesis II posits that institutional ownership will have a positive impact on firm 
performance in the casino sector. This hypothesis is supported at the 0.05 level. Treating 
institutional ownership as an endogenous explanatory variable and employing the 2SLS 
technique as suggested by the DWH test, casino firm performance as measured by proxy 
Q is dependent on the percentage o f institutional ownership (t = 2.185,/? = 0.031) at the 
0.05 significance level. Alternatively treating institutional ownership as a pure exogenous 
explanatory variable, the OLS results support Hypothesis II—that institutional ownership 
significantly influences casino firm performance in a positive manner (t = 1.970,/? = 
0.051) at the 0.1 significance level.
Hypothesis III posits that institutional ownership will have a positive impact on firm 
performance in the hotel sector. This hypothesis is not supported as the other two sectors 
were. Treating institutional ownership either endogenously or exogenously, hotel firm
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performance as measured by proxy Q is not dependent on the percentage o f institutional 
ownership at the 0.1 significance level.
Assumptions Checking 
The underlying assumptions including normality, linearity and homoscedasticity of 
residuals for both the OLS and 2SLS techniques were examined by residuals scatterplots 
in which one axis is predicted scores o f proxy Q  and the other axis is errors o f prediction 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Only relevant residuals scatterplots produced by the suitable 
techniques (OLS or 2SLS) in Eqs. (1) and (2) for the three sectors are presented in 
Figures 20-25 that follow. After comparing residuals scatterplots in Figures 20-25 in this 
study with examples o f serious violations provided by Tabachnick & Fidell (2001), 
except for Figure 22, it appears that no major violations on the assumptions o f the OLS 
and 2SLS regression are present in this study. The pattern of residuals in Figure 22 
suggests that there might be some missing variables omitted from the casino firm 
performance model, and this is supported by the low adjusted R-squared of 0.045 of the 
model.
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Figure 20. Residuals Scatterplot for Restaurant Firm Performance (2SLS)
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Figure 21. Residuals Scatterplot for Restaurant Institutional Ownership (OLS)
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Figure 22. Residuals Scatterplot for Casino Firm Performance (2SLS)
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Figure 23. Residuals Scatterplot for Casino Institutional Ownership (OLS)
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Figure 24. Residuals Scatterplot for Hotel Firm Performance (OLS)
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Figure 25. Residuals Scatterplot for Hotel Institutional Ownership (2SLS)
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As mentioned in Chapter Three, the order condition for identification for equations in 
a simultaneous equations system can be checked when constructing the model, and the 
rank condition for identification can only be checked after data analysis. The rank 
condition for identification states that the first equation in a two-equation simultaneous 
system is identified if, and only if, the second equation includes at least one exogenous 
variable excluded from the first equation and the coefficient o f the excluded exogenous 
variable has a non-zero coefficient (Wooldridge, 2003). That is, the rank condition for 
identification is met for Eq. (1) if  at least one of the coefficients for ROA, BETA and DIV 
in Eq. (2) is non-zero. Similarly, the rank condition for identification is met for Eq. (2) if  
the coefficient for FIX in Eq. (1) is not zero. Examining the regression results section in 
this chapter confirms that the rank condition for identification for equations in this 
dissertation is met since none o f the excluded exogenous variables in any equation has a 
zero coefficient.
Summary
Statistical analysis and findings on the relationship between institutional ownership 
and firm performance for the three sectors o f the hospitality industry were presented in 
this chapter. The descriptive statistics o f the variables involved in this study were 
presented; the DWH tests were performed on INST and proxy Q to justify the need and 
adoption o f the 2SLS technique in either the firm performance equation or the 
institutional ownership equation; both OLS and 2SLS regression analyses were employed 
after the DWH test, in an attempt to identify whether any significant relationship existed 
between institutional ownership and firm performance; relevant data analysis results were
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discussed; and lastly, the underlying assumptions o f regression analysis were checked. 
Next, summary, conclusions and recommendations for future research will be presented 
in Chapter Five.
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CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Introduction
Since Berle & Means (1932) first noted the problems caused by the separation of 
ownership and control in corporations, the impact o f ownership structure on firm 
performance has been a subject o f debate. The rising importance o f institutional investors 
in corporate governance has been observed in the growth of institutional ownership in the 
U.S. corporate equity market during the last several decades. The ownership 
structure/firm performance relationship is further complicated in the agency framework 
when institutional investors represent a number o f individual investors as a whole and act 
as major shareholders in the firm. The financial theory has hypothesized that institutional 
ownership can increase managerial monitoring from a corporate governance perspective, 
mitigate agency problems and thus help improve firm performance (Black, 1992; 
Chaganti & Damanpour, 1991; Pound, 1991). Empirically, many researchers have 
examined the relationship between institutional ownership and firm performance in the 
major industries including the manufacturing sectors, but the conclusions have been 
mixed (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Chaganti & Damanpour, 1991; Clay, 2001; Craswell 
et al., 1997; Han & Suk, 1998; Loderer & Martin, 1997; McConnell & Servaes, 1990;
122
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Woidtke, 2002). To my best knowledge, to date, no research has been conducted on how 
financial institutions may influence firm performance through their stockholdings in the 
hospitality industry. Therefore, the main goals o f this dissertation were to examine the 
impact of institutional ownership on firm performance in the hospitality industry, 
particularly in the restaurant, casino and hotel sectors; compare the results with those of 
previous studies; and provide interpretation and implications of the findings. The 
empirical findings from this study should contribute to the body of knowledge in 
hospitality finance from the perspective o f a major service industry.
This chapter first summarizes the findings o f this dissertation. Implications o f the 
findings are then discussed. Next, limitations o f the study are addressed, and, finally, the 
last section o f this chapter presents a list o f recommendations for future research.
Summary of the Study 
This study was designed to investigate the relationship between institutional 
ownership and firm performance in the hospitality industry, particularly in the restaurant, 
casino and hotel sectors. In consideration of the research questions and after a review of 
related literature, a simultaneous equations system including a firm performance equation 
and another institutional ownership equation was proposed. In addition, three hypotheses 
were constructed that posit a significant and positive impact o f institutional ownership on 
firm performance in the three sectors.
In the firm performance equation [i.e., Eq. (1)], proxy Q was selected as the firm 
performance measure and as the dependent variable, while the independent variables 
were INST, SIZE, DEBT, and FIX. In the institutional ownership equation [i.e., Eq. (2)],
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the percentage o f institutional ownership o f a firm’s outstanding shares was the 
dependent variable, while the independent variables were proxy g , SIZE, ROA, BETA, 
DEBT, and DIV. Most o f the independent variables in Eqs. (1) and (2), including SIZE, 
DEBT, FIX, ROA, BETA, DEBT and DIV are all firm-specific variables and act as 
control variables for the possibility of their causing spurious relationship between 
institutional ownership and firm performance. The selection and inclusion o f the control 
variables were justified by current financial theory and from previous studies.
Ownership endogeneity was a major concern and consideration in this study. 
Ownership endogeneity states that the ownership structure o f a firm, whether 
concentrated or diffused, is an endogenous outcome o f competitive selection within the 
firm leading to firm value maximization (Demsetz, 1983). The results o f the study 
provide evidence on the endogeneity o f institutional ownership in the restaurant and 
casino sectors based on the DWH test and support previous studies arguing ownership 
structure endogeneity in other industries (Cho, 1998; Clay, 2001; Demsetz, 1983; 
Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001; Holdemess et al., 1999; Loderer & 
Martin, 1997). While those studies arguing for ownership endogeneity simply apply the 
2SLS technique without statistical justifications and then compare the results with those 
obtained from the OLS technique, the DWH test in this study acts not only to test the 
“suspicious” endogeneity of institutional ownership, but also to justify the need for the 
2SLS technique in a simultaneous equations framework. From a statistical standpoint, 
acting as an endogenous explanatory variable in Eq. (1). in the restaurant and casino 
sectors, the institutional ownership variable (i.e., INST) was found related to the error 
term of the firm performance variable (i.e., proxy Q); from a practical standpoint, the
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level o f institutional ownership in restaurant and casino firms was found endogenously 
determined by firm-specific factors such as firm size and debt ratio. All six control 
variables in this study also act as instrumental variables in equations where the 2SLS 
technique is appropriate.
To accomplish the main goal o f this study, three major sectors o f the hospitality 
industry, namely restaurant, casino and hotel, were identified and selected for analysis 
based on their individual NAICS code numbers. Given the availability o f accounting and 
financial data o f the hospitality firms o f interest, the period o f 1999-2003 was chosen as 
the study time frame and each firm/year observation was treated as an unique case in the 
pooled sample for the three sectors respectively. The final sample consisted o f 284 
restaurant firm/year observations, 106 casino firm/year observations, and 75 hotel 
firm/year observations. From an individual firm perspective, the sample included 65 
restaurant firms, 24 casino firms, and 19 hotel firms.
The empirical findings o f this study show that, firstly, in the restaurant sector, the 
percentage o f institutional ownership significantly influences firm performance and vice 
versa. Secondly, in the casino sector, the percentage of institutional ownership was also 
found to be a significant determinant o f firm performance, but the reverse is not true. 
Lastly, in the hotel sector, no significant relationship between institutional ownership and 
firm performance is present. A summary o f findings for the three sectors are presented in 
Table 23, 24, and 25 respectively.
In testing the three hypotheses. Hypothesis I positing a significant and positive impact 
o f institutional ownership on restaurant firm performance was supported. Hypothesis II 
positing a significant and positive impact o f institutional ownership on casino firm
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performance was also supported. But, Hypothesis III posting a significant and positive 
impact o f institutional ownership on hotel firm performance was not supported in this 
study.
Table 23 Summary o f Findings for the Restaurant Sector
Firm Performance Equation 
Ecp(l)
Institutional Ownership Equation
EqX2)
Dependent
0 INST
Variable
Explanatory
Predicted Actual Significant? Predicted Actual Significant?
Variable
Q + + Yes
INST + + Yes
SIZE -  -  Yes + + Yes
DEBT + /- + Yes -  - Yes
FIX + /- + Yes
ROA + + Yes
BETA +/— — No
DIV + /- - Yes
Hypothesis I Supported NA
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Table 24 Summary of Findings for the Casino Sector
Firm Performance Equation Institutional Ownership Equation
E q .( l ) Eq.(2)
Dependent
Variable
0 INST
Explanatory
Variable
Predicted Actual Significant? Predicted Actual Significant?
Q + + No
INST + + Yes
SIZE -  -  Yes + 4- Yes
DEBT +/— + Yes -  - Yes
FIX + /-  + No
ROA + + No
BETA + /- + No
DIV +/~ + No
Hypothesis II Supported NA
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Table 25 Summary o f Findings for the Hotel Sector
Firm Performance Equation Institutional Ownership Equation
Eq. (1) Eq.(2)
Dependent
0 INST
Variable
Explanatory
Predicted Actual Significant? Predicted Actual Significant?
Variable
0 + + No
INST + + No
SIZE — + No + + No
DEBT + /-  -  Yes -  -  No
FIX + /-  -  No
ROA + -  No
BETA + /- -  No
DIV + /-  -  Yes
Hypothesis III Not Supported NA
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Implications o f Hypothesis I Findings 
This dissertation has found institutional ownership to be a significant and positive 
determinant o f firm performance as measured by proxy Q in the restaurant sector during 
1999-2003. Acting as a cohort and representing individual investors, financial institutions 
seem to successfully play the role o f major shareholders in restaurant firms. They may 
have exercised their right as shareholders and exerted their voting and monitoring power 
in restaurant firms in order to fulfill their fiduciary duties to their investors, thus helping 
enhance firm performance instead o f just following the traditional “exit policy” when 
dissatisfied with firm management and incurring substantial losses as a result. 
Traditionally, institutions simply follow the “Wall Street Rule” or an “exit policy” when 
dissatisfied with firm management, and hence barely have any impact on firm 
performance (Bathala et al., 1994; Graves & Waddock, 1990).
In the restaurant sample in this study, the average institutional ownership percentage 
increased steadily from 38.7% in 1999 to 42.7% in 2003. This seems to indicate 
institutional investors’ increasing interest in investing in the restaurant sector. With the 
rising importance o f institutional ownership in publicly traded restaurant firms, 
institutions may have assumed an efficient monitoring role in influencing firm 
decision-making in a positive manner and achieved a better firm performance as 
evidenced by the results o f this study. In the meantime, the low-debt restaurant sector 
may have offered an attractive corporate governance environment for financial 
institutions to exercise their equity-purchasing power and management monitoring, and 
helped improve restaurant firm performance by involving them in corporate 
decision-making process. Higher DEBT, as with higher institutional ownership, resulting
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in better restaurant firm performance as measured by proxy Q in a significant way in this 
study indicates some level o f efficient monitoring provided by creditors. In addition, the 
negative sign o f DEBT in the institutional ownership equation provides further evidence 
that institutional ownership and debt leverage may have become substitutes in mitigating 
the agency problems/costs in the agency framework in the restaurant sector as evidenced 
in previous studies (Bathala et al., 1994; Crutchley et al., 1999). In other words, 
institutional ownership in restaurant firms not only can substitute creditors in the 
monitoring functions in the agency framework, but also can act as a firm performance 
enhancer.
As mentioned in Chapter One, stock performance is o f critical importance to 
investors’ vested interest in restaurant firms, and therefore affects their desire to invest in 
the restaurant sector. As a result, investing in the restaurant sector institutionally may be a 
better form o f investing than individually for restaurant investors to diminish the agency 
problem caused by the separation o f management from ownership. Financial institutions 
have collective and, hence, greater monitoring power over firm management on behalf of 
individual investors. This helps improve firm performance and enhance the value of 
restaurant firms in the equity market. In addition, individual investors may chase 
institutions’ buy/sell decisions on restaurant firm stocks, in that shareholdings by 
institutions indicate possible firm performance enhancement in the future.
Furthermore, financial institutions are also attracted to better-performing, larger and 
more profitable restaurant firms with lower financial leverage and dividend payouts.
Most likely, institutional investment managers prefer better-performing restaurant firms 
in order to fulfill their fiduciary duties to investors. Therefore, institutional ownership and
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firm performance affect each other significantly and positively in a simultaneous 
framework in the restaurant sector. More institutional monitoring o f restaurant firm 
management helps institutions and individual investors gauge firm operations and 
corporate decisions in a more transparent way, and therefore reduce investment risk.
These findings can certainly further help restaurant firm management recognize possible 
influence and monitoring derived from the presence of institutional investors through 
shareholdings. This can encourage corporate management to direct the firm towards 
value maximization that is in the shareholders’ best interests. The board o f directors in 
restaurant firms may also utilize their debt and dividend policies interchangeably, or 
simultaneously, as an instrument to manage the level and possible influence of 
institutional ownership in the firm in mitigating the agency problem or the agency costs.
Implications o f Hypothesis II Findings 
Similar to what was found in the restaurant sector, institutional ownership is deemed 
a significant and positive determinant o f firm performance as measured by proxy Q in the 
casino sector during 1999-2003. Despite the possible hindrance o f ownership restrictions 
set forth in state gaming regulations such as those in the states o f Nevada and New Jersey, 
institutional investors play an important role in the corporate governance arena o f casino 
firms, as supported by their positive influence on firm performance in this study. For 
example, although an institutional investor is refrained from owning more than 15% of 
equity shares o f a casino firm in Nevada, if  a waiver o f finding o f suitability is to be 
granted, individual institutional investors together may be able to act as a cohort of
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investors in a single casino firm and collectively exert significant influence on casino 
firm performance.
In the casino sample in this study, the average institutional ownership percentage 
increased steadily from 43.3% in 1999 to 50.7% in 2002, but decreased to 43.2% in 2003. 
The sudden decrease in institutional ownership in 2003 may be due to unknown factors, 
and it deserves a separate examination. The seemingly increasing trend o f institutional 
ownership from 1999 to 2002, accompanied by an increasing mean proxy Q o f 1.09 in 
1999 to 1.15 in 2002, shows that institutions may have assumed an efficient monitoring 
role in influencing firm decisions in a positive way and contributed to better firm 
performance as evidenced in the casino sector. As a result, investing in the casino sector 
institutionally could be a better investment form than individually for casino investors to 
reduce the agency problem caused by the separation of management from ownership.
The negative sign o f DEBT in the institutional ownership equation further indicates 
that institutional ownership and debt leverage may have become substitutes in mitigating 
the agency problems/costs in the agency framework in the casino sector as evidenced in 
the restaurant sector and in previous studies (Bathala et al., 1994; Crutchley et al., 1999). 
While DEBT signifies a significant and positive impact on casino firm performance as 
measured by proxy Q and suggests some level o f efficient monitoring provided by 
creditors in this study, institutional ownership not only may substitute DEBT in the 
agency relationship but also may help improve firm performance.
On the other hand, the findings o f this study show that financial institutions are 
attracted to larger casino firms with lower financial leverage. Casino firm management, 
on the other hand, should be aware o f institutional investors’ potential influence on firm
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performance and in corporate management decision-making process through their 
shareholdings, and manage the firm in a way that maximizes firm value. As with the 
restaurant sector, the board o f directors in casino firms may also utilize their debt policy 
as a tool to direct the level and possible influence o f institutional investors in the firm in 
controlling the agency problem.
Implications o f Hypothesis III Findings
Different the restaurant and casino sectors, institutional ownership in the hotel sector 
does not influence firm performance as measured by proxy Q during 1999-2003. 
Financial institutions, given their average institutional ownership o f 43.9% (see Table 7) 
in this study, play the role o f major shareholders in hotel firms, but perhaps not in a 
significant and efficient way that could have influenced firm performance in a positive 
manner as hypothesized.
The average institutional ownership percentage in the hotel sample in this study 
increased gradually from 40.37% in 1999 to 46.59% in 2003. This suggests institutional 
investors’ rising interest in incorporating hotel firms in their portfolio. However, possibly 
due to their insufficient participation in corporate governance in hotel firms, institutional 
investors’ influence is not significantly demonstrated in firm performance. That is, they 
may not be efficient monitors o f firm management in the agency framework and simply 
act as passive investors. Another possibility of the lack of a significant institutional 
ownership/firm performance relationship is that, institutional ownership in hotel firms is 
an endogenously determined outcome o f competitive selection o f ownership structures
133
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
leading to firm value maximization, and, therefore, no systematic relationship between 
the two was observed.
The non-significant relationship between institutional ownership and debt leverage 
suggests that institutional ownership may not have become a substitute for debt leverage 
in mitigating the agency problems/costs in the hotel sector as evidenced in the restaurant 
and casino sectors in this and previous studies (Bathala et ah, 1994; Crutchley et ah, 
1999). This further suggests that institutional investors play a passive role in hotel firms. 
Consequently, investing in the hotel sector institutionally may not be considered a better 
form o f investing than individually for hotel investors to reduce the agency problem 
caused by the separation o f management from ownership.
Limitations
Two limitations o f this study are addressed in this section. First, due to data 
availability issues, each firm/year observation was treated as an unique case and all 
firm/year observations were pooled as a sample for analysis in each hospitality sector. 
Since not every firm has the same number o f years o f data available, for example some 
may have full five years o f data and some may have just one, some firms may carry more 
“weight” than others through their presence in the pooled sample. Taking an average of 
five years o f data from 1999-2003 for each firm would be ideal but there are not many 
publicly traded hospitality firms, particularly in the casino and hotel sectors, that warrant 
the regression analysis employed in this study.
The second limitation is the treatment o f fiscal year versus calendar year in this study. 
While institutional ownership percentage is calculated as the year-end (i.e., December 31
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or the last trading day o f the year) percentage o f outstanding ordinary shares of firms 
owned by financial institutions, hospitality firms have different end months for their 
fiscal years. While firms normally end the fiscal year in December, some, for example, 
end in January, April or July. This discrepancy may raise some issue as to how to 
attribute firm performance o f a fiscal year to a proper calendar year matching the 
corresponding institutional ownership information of that specific year. COMPUSTAT 
attributes accounting and financial data o f firms with fiscal year ending in months prior to 
June to the previous year, and ending in the month o f June or later to the existing year.
For example. Bob Evans Farms, Inc. (NASDAQ; BOBE) ends its fiscal year in April 
2003, and COMPUSTAT attributes its accounting and financial data to year 2002, while 
Sonic Corporation (NASDAQ: SONC) ends its fiscal year in August 2003 and 
COMPUSTAT attributes the data to year 2003.
Recommendations for Future Research 
The relationship between ownership structure and firm performance has emerged as a 
promising research domain for hospitality researchers. In particular, the empirical 
findings o f the institutional ownership/firm performance relationship from this 
dissertation have advanced the domain one step further. A list o f recommendations is 
presented in this section for future research to either affirm the findings o f this 
dissertation or extend beyond what has been studied.
First, different types o f firm performance measures may be adopted in modeling the 
institutional ownership/firm performance relationship. This study adopted a proxy for 
Tobin’s Q as a firm performance measure with justifications. Future studies may employ
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other firm performance measures such as ROE, ROA or stock returns used in other 
studies (Chaganti & Damanpour, 1991; Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Han & Suck, 1998) to 
affirm the empirical findings on the institutional ownership/firm performance relationship 
as evidenced in this study. For the casino sector, other firm performance measures, such 
as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) or cash flow, 
may be adopted since these measures may be more relevant in gauging casino firm 
performance/profitability.
Second, the impact o f voting versus non-voting shares held by financial institutions 
on firm performance can be further examined. Institutional ownership percentage in this 
study includes both voting and non-voting shares. A premise for the monitoring role 
assumed by stockholders o f a firm is that these shares are home with the voting right that 
enables stockholders to vote on matters such as corporate policies and composition o f the 
board o f directors. Future study may separate institutional voting and non-voting 
ownership and examine their relationships with hospitality firm performance respectively. 
Therefore, the impact o f voting versus non-voting institutional ownerships on hospitality 
firm performance could be more specifically and precisely identified. Furthermore, the 
impact o f shareholdings by active versus non-active institutions on firm performance may 
be examined. As discussed in Chapter Two, possibly due to the free rider problem in 
institutional shareholder activism, only 13 institutions out of a sample o f 975 were 
identified as active and having ever submitted a shareholder proposal during 1986-1994 
(Daily et ah, 1996). Thus, the impact o f active versus non-active institutions on firm 
performance in the hospitality industry deserves a further investigation.
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Third, other types o f shareholders such as managerial ownership and block 
shareholdings may be modeled with institutional ownership simultaneously in future 
studies. Since various types o f ownership are considered endogenously determined and 
have been evidenced by this study and some prior studies (Cho, 1998; Clay, 2001; 
Demsetz, 1983; Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001; Holdemess et ah, 
1999; Loderer & Martin, 1997), inclusion o f other ownership types along with 
institutional ownership in the model may further reveal the impact o f institutional 
ownership on firm performance while taking into consideration the inter-relationship 
among managerial ownership, block-shareholder ownership and institutional ownership.
Fourth, other relevant firm-specific variables that may affect proxy g  as a firm 
performance measure may be included as additional control variables in the model. For 
example, advertising expenditures as a fraction o f sales revenues is often considered and 
included as a control variable in the firm performance equation employing Tobin’s g  as a 
performance measure in previous studies (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996 Demsetz & 
Villalonga, 2001; McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Morck et al., 1988; Woidtke, 2002) 
because its potential influence is ignored when calculating Tobin’s Q. Advertising often 
leads to brand recognition and potential sales, and hence is an indicator for future growth 
opportunities (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Gelb, 2002) or firm performance. Currently 
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) requires expenditures on advertising to 
be immediately expensed in financial report and this accounting practice may understate 
book values for firms with significant levels o f advertising expenditures, and distort 
proxy Q (Amir & Lev, 1996). Inclusion o f advertising expenditures in the model provides 
a function similar to other tangible assets in contributing to firm growth (Welch, 2003).
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Advertising expenditures as a fraction of sales was originally considered in Eq. (1) o f this 
study. The hospitality industry relies on advertising to some extent for its operations and, 
therefore, its potential influence on proxy Q should be considered. However, not many 
firms explicitly report their advertising expenditures in the annual report. Advertising 
expenditures may be reported under either sales and marketing or general marketing 
expenses.
Fifth, promotion expenditures can be added as an additional control variable in the 
casino firm performance model. Similar to what advertising expenditures may have 
contributed to firm performance enhancement, promotions play an extremely important 
role in casino operations and marketing, and hence may help generate better firm 
performance not captured in the calculation of proxy Q used in this study.
Sixth, using quarterly data, future studies may examine the impact of changes in 
institutional ownership on lagged firm performance in the hospitality industry. That is, 
examining the impact o f changes in institutional ownership in the current quarter on firm 
performance in the next few quarters may more precisely gauge the true impact that 
institutional investors have on performance of the firm.
Seventh, the heterogeneity o f institutional investors in future studies can be 
considered. As mentioned in Chapter One, different types of institutional investors, such 
as public pension funds, private pension funds, mutual funds, and insurance companies, 
may demonstrate different investment behaviors and pursue diverse objectives subject to 
various conditions and constraints. While this study treated institutional investors as a 
homogenous group due to data availability, separating institutional investors by types 
may further reveal other impacts on hospitality firm performance.
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Finally, government regulations on casino gaming and institutional ownership in 
different gaming jurisdictions may be further considered in modeling the institutional 
ownership/firm performance relationship in the casino sector in future studies. Although 
institutional ownership shows a positive and significant impact on casino firm 
performance in this study, the extent o f the role that government regulations play, if  any, 
in the context o f this study is unknown. The State o f Nevada imposes a 15% institutional 
ownership restriction in a casino firm if  a finding o f suitability is to be waived. Will 
different percentages lead to different institutional behavior in their investment strategies? 
Will different state regulations regarding institutional ownership on casino gaming result 
in different conclusions on the institutional ownership/firm performance relationship in 
the casino sector? Are government regulations regarding institutional ownership in casino 
firms advantageous to institutions, firm management, or the investors? These answers 
should be answered in future studies.
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